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C 0 M M E
The Temptation to Intervene
Richard M illett
A braham  Lowenthal of the Inter-American Dialogue once sug­gested that United States policy toward Latin America could be summed up in two popular slo­
gans: Arpege’s “promise them any­
thing,” and Hallmark's “when you 
care enough to send the very best.” 
By the latter, Lowenthal was refer­
ring to our repeated tendency to dis­
patch the Marines a n d /o r  other ele­
ments of our armed forces to Latin 
America, ostensibly to prom ote the 
region’s own best interests.
The temptation to use military 
force, directly or indirectly, in an 
effort to resolve our problems in the 
Western Hemisphere has afflicted 
most 20th century presidents. 
Theodore Roosevelt used military 
force to reoccupy Cuba and to 
secure Panam a’s separation from 
Colombia. Taft sent the Marines to 
Nicaragua. Wilson occupied Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic, and 
sent troops to Cuba, Panama, and 
twice into Mexico. Coolidge 
launched the second US occupation 
of Nicaragua and embroiled the 
Marines in a prolonged guerrilla 
struggle with the forces of General 
Augusto Cesar Sandino.
Beginning with Franklin 
Roosevelt, the United States regular­
ly promised to end the use of mili­
tary intervention, but these promises 
have been honored more in their 
breach than in their observance.
Richard Millett is a historian of the 
military in Latin America. He is cur­
rently senior research associate at the 
Washington office of the North-South 
Center.
FDR himself used the threat of over­
whelming military force to prom ote 
the ouster of Cuban dictator 
Gerardo Machado. Truman consid­
ered sending troops into Colombia 
during the 1948 Bogota riots, but 
wi ely refrained from such action. 
Eisenhower turned to proxy forces 
supported by the CIA to oust the 
Arbenz regime in Guatemala. 
Kennedy used the threat of force to 
pressure the Trujillo family out of 
the Dominican Republic, launched 
an unsuccessful exile invasion of 
Cuba, and barely avoided arm ed 
intervention in Haiti. Lyndon 
Johnson sent the military into the 
Dominican Republic and dispatched 
naval units to the coast of Brazil to 
encourage a military coup in that 
nation. Nixon preferred a covert 
style in operations as demonstrated 
in his prom otion of the 1973 coup 
in Chile. Carter actually opposed 
military intervention, although he 
did lobby for the dispatch of an OAS 
force to Nicaragua. Reagan suffered 
from no such inhibitions, interven­
ing in Grenada, promoting the 
Contra war in Nicaragua, and send­
ing massive military aid to El Sal­
vador. Bush invaded Panama and 
Clinton, of course, sent US troops 
into Haiti.
What is perhaps most notable 
about this dreary list is that direct, 
unilateral intervention has become 
increasingly unpalatable and recent 
presidents have increasingly turned 
to thinly veiled covert operations or 
have sought multilateral support for 
US operations. Enthusiasm for any 
prolonged military presence has also 
waned, especially in Congress, which 
has frequently sought to place limits 
on the use of military force. The 
American public also seems increas­
ingly disenchanted with military 
intervention as an instrum ent of for­
eign policy, especially since the 
unhappy outcome of US involve­
m ent in Somalia. There may now be 
even less enthusiasm for multilateral 
interventions than for unilateral 
operations, a tone reflected in the 
policy pronouncem ents of some 
congressional leaders.
One factor in this may be the per­
vasive power of television, what 
Ambassador Clovis Maksoud of The 
American University has described 
as the “CNNization of the world.” 
The defects and dangers of military 
operations are graphically presented 
in a way that overwhelms any 
abstract arguments as to their poten­
tial long range benefits. Combined 
with this is the impact of the Cold 
War’s end. Interventions were justi­
fied for decades as being necessary 
to combat some international m en­
ace to US security. Today, such men­
aces seem largely absent from the 
hemisphere. President Bush 
invoked fear of narcotics trafficking 
as a justification for invading 
Panama, but the failure of that oper­
ation to produce any impact on 
America’s domestic drug problem 
has underm ined future use of that 
rationale.
The military is also less than 
enthusiastic about such operations. 
Fearing involvement in unpopular 
and prolonged missions and viewing 
the Western Hemisphere as a m inor 
area in their global responsibilities, 
the overwhelming majority of senior 
commanders do whatever they can 
do to discourage the political leader­
ship from direct interventions.
While searching for new missions in 
the post-Cold War world, most offi­
cers remain unconvinced that
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Old habits die hard
nation-building in small, poor coun­
tries is a desirable one.
Like many contem porary issues, 
military intervention produces 
much stronger negative than posi­
tive reactions. Critics find it easy to 
organize opposition, elicit public 
fears and, often, set the terms of the 
public policy debate. Apprehensive 
over offending any major ethnic or 
other pressure group, most politi­
cians hesitate to call for the use of 
military force, preferring to let the 
potential onus for any such deci­
sions fall on the executive branch.
Despite such inhibitions, the 
temptation to intervene endures. 
While fearing negative public reac­
tions to the use of force, most presi­
dents are equally concerned about
appearing unable to respond to 
upheavals in what is still widely per­
ceived as America’s backyard. While 
most recognize that Latin Americans 
have both the right and the capacity 
to manage their own affairs, the 
emotional force of American pater­
nalism has not disappeared. Many 
on the right still see Latin America 
as a mixture of Desi Arnaz, Carmen 
Miranda, and assorted baseball play­
ers, emotionally unstable and in 
need of US tutelage, by force if nec­
essary, in order to handle their own 
affairs. On the left, opposition to 
intervention is stronger, but can 
almost disappear in situations where 
past US policies are cited as the 
cause of current oppression. Haiti 
provided a clear example of the
capacity of guilt to overcome much 
of the opposition to intervention.
Despite growing criticism over the 
results of such operations, Haiti is 
unlikely to be the last arm ed US in­
tervention. Force remains a ready 
alternative to frustrated leaders, es­
pecially when measures such as eco­
nomic sanctions fail to produce the 
desired results. Indeed, reliance on 
such measures, which are deceptive­
ly easy to initiate, but are rarely suc­
cessful and can be abandoned only 
at considerable political cost, may 
actually increase the chances of an 
ultimate resort to force. The refrain 
of Tom Lehrer’s satirical song from 
the 1960s, “when in doubt, send the 
Marines,” remains an apt expression 
of the temptation to intervene. ■
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As the Rio Grande Wanes
Aaron Segal
T
he im plem entation of 
the N orth American 
Free Trade Agreem ent 
(NAFTA) has resulted 
in an impressive 
increase in trade 
between Mexico and the US. New 
jobs are being generated—in the 
US, primarily in high technology 
exports; in Mexico, mainly in 
assembly plants and services— 
reflecting the fact that at the onset 
of NAFTA, average Mexican tariffs 
had come down to a level slightly 
below those of the US. At the same 
time, jobs, mostly of the unskilled 
and semi-skilled variety, are being 
lost on both sides of the border 
because labor is a significant por­
tion of total production cost.
NAFTA, however, opens banking, 
insurance, trucking, and other 
highly protected sectors in Mexico 
for the first time. Responding to 
these new opportunities, US firms 
are making new investments, m erg­
ers, and acquisitions. A few 
Mexican companies, like Vidrios de 
Monterrey, have invested in the US 
to acquire technology and sales net­
works.
The risks from NAFTA are much 
greater in Mexico than in the US, 
yet no significant opposition has 
em erged. Mexican trade agree­
ments with Central and South 
America have brought few concrete 
benefits. Mexican trade with Japan 
consists largely of selling petroleum  
for m anufactured products, and 
trade with the European
Aaron Segal is professor of political 
science at the University of Texas at 
El Paso.
Community follows a similar pat­
tern.
Mexico’s long-term challenge is 
to provide em ploym ent for the one 
million citizens who jo in  the work 
force each year, most of whom have 
less than a fourth grade education. 
Currently, 18-25 year-olds suffer 
from massive unem ploym ent and 
underem ploym ent. NAFTA is 
regarded by many Mexicans as the 
only option for generating invest­
ment, technology transfers, and 
jobs.
Although immigrants may 
be friends and relatives, 
Mexican Americans 
of all social strata are 
increasingly supportive of 
tough border policing.
NAFTA reverses the historic rela­
tionship between the US and 
Mexico while creating what econo­
mist Sidney W eintraub calls a 
“m arriage of convenience.” What 
NAFTA portends for relations 
between Mexicans and Mexican- 
Americans has yet to be examined.
The key issue dividing Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans will contin­
ue to be migration. Both Mexico 
City and Washington agreed in 
advance to exclude it from the 
NAFTA negotiations, but NAFTA is 
likely to increase Mexican expecta­
tions and awareness of wage and 
jo b  opportunities in the US. 
Meanwhile, immigration from 
Mexico is changing in response to a
decade of economic stagnation at 
hom e and an American economy 
which continues to grow at a m od­
est pace. U ndocum ented and legal 
Mexican immigrants are m ore and 
m ore reuniting their families with 
the intention of staying in the US. 
The practice of young Mexican 
m en entering the US as tem porary 
workers and sending substantial 
remittances to their families across 
the border is declining.
Emigration to the US is im por­
tant to Mexico as an escape hatch 
for an estim ated five per cent of the 
total Mexican labor force. It also 
accounts for well over one billion 
dollars a year in remittances, m uch 
of it to distressed rural areas. Even 
with NAFTA’s increased trade, 
Mexico has no alternative to these 
US jobs and dollars. Scholars of 
Mexican immigration argue that 
Mexican migrants fill low-wage jobs 
which few Americans consider 
accepting. They also cite the hard­
ships endured  by Mexican immi­
grants as further proof that they are 
filling a vacuum in the US econo­
my.
Mexican-Americans, especially in 
the border areas, view legal and 
undocum ented immigrants as 
direct com petitors for scarce and 
low-paying unskilled jobs in con­
struction, farm labor, and the ser­
vice sector. Although immigrants 
may be friends and relatives, 
Mexican-Americans of all social 
strata are increasingly supportive of 
tough border policing measures. 
Social mobility am ong low-income 
Mexican-Americans is so slow that 
they are bound to regard new immi­
grants as an economic threat.
There are few good ideas about 
what to do in regard to immigra­
Hertiisphere •  Volume Six, Number Three
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What integration means for Mexicans and Mexican-Americans
tion from Mexico. The proponents 
of tem porary Mexican m igrant 
worker schemes along the lines of 
the 1942-54 Bracero Agreem ent 
face intense anti-immigration senti­
m ent in the US and deep ambiva­
lence in Mexico. The European 
Community and the Japanese have 
experienced tem porary guest-work- 
er programs and have found that 
preventing these guest workers 
from staying is extremely difficult. 
Measures to tighten US border con­
trols and require US identity cards 
as a condition of obtaining employ­
m ent are expensive, cumbersome 
to enforce, and unlikely to be effec­
tive.
Environm ental problem s along 
the US-Mexico border are building 
up as another im portant and divi­
sive issue. In spite of commitments 
made by the NAFTA add-on agree­
ments, i.e., the establishment of a 
bilateral environm ental commis­
sion, little is likely to be accom­
plished. Mexico lacks the public 
funds, trained staff, and political 
will to tackle the immense problems 
on its side of the border. These 
problem s worsen on a daily basis as 
poor migrants from the interior 
pour into Mexico’s border cities. 
Mexican officials give the highest 
priority to the m ore expensive and 
complex water, air pollution, 
sewage, and other environm ental 
problem s of Mexico City.
The population on the US side of 
the border lacks political clout in 
Washington and state capitals. 
Though public spending on envi­
ronm ental clean-ups could boost 
the border economies, the money is 
more likely to be a trickle than a 
flood. The prospects are slim for 
cross-border coalitions of poor peo-
P r o p o s i t i o n  1 8 7
Ballot initiative 187’s overwhelming victory in the November 1994 
California elections was also a shocking defeat for the de facto coali­
tion o f Mexican-American organizations and the Mexican govern­
ment. Fierce statem ents by Mexican officials, organized dem onstra­
tions in Mexico, vivid coverage of the bitter campaign in the 
Mexican media, and mass rallies by Hispanic high school students 
failed to produce a high Mexican-American voter turnout. Large 
num bers of them did no t register to vote or stayed at home. Those 
who did vote evinced support for Proposition 187, which would 
deny non-emergency social services to persons found to be in the 
US illegally.
While US courts adjudicate the constitutionality of Proposition 187, 
the Mexican governm ent of Ernesto Zedillo is also being challenged 
on its own im migration laws and practices, which fall most heavily 
on Guatemalan and Salvadoran illegals. Meanwhile there appears 
to be insufficient political support in Florida or Texas—two other 
states with high im migrant populations—to introduce 187-type ini­
tiatives. ■
pie who are the most hu rt by bur­
geoning environm ental crises.
There are scores of o ther issues— 
from m onetary policy and 
exchange rates to civil aviation and 
tourism—but none impact on rela­
tions between Mexicans and 
Mexican-Americans like the envi­
ronm ent and immigration. Like 
everything else, attitudes of 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans 
are changing. Mexicans increasing­
ly view their northerly compatriots 
as a potential consum er m arket and 
political ally. Mexican-Americans 
are beginning to take pride in an 
industrialized, urban Mexico which 
values its culture, as opposed to 
feeling sadness for a land of pover­
ty, repression, and injustice. By
accelerating contact of all kinds, 
NAFTA accelerates these attitudinal 
changes. ■
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The Message of the Media
Gonzalo Soruco
P
ress coverage of Latin 
America has been notori­
ously poor in the twenti­
eth century. For decades 
the US m edia conde­
scendingly portrayed the 
region through stereotypes. News 
of crises dominated. While the 
inform ation revolution, the end of 
the Cold War, and the December 
1994 Summit of the Americas have 
not changed the quality of that cov­
erage, there has been a change in 
its focus. Less driven by crisis, 
today’s coverage of the region has 
entered the new era of drug news.
T h e  P r e ss  a n d  t h e  G o o d  N e ig h b o r
At a press conference on January 
20, 1940, President Roosevelt ex­
pressed his adm inistration’s new 
approach to trading with Latin 
America: “Give them  [the Latin 
Americans] a share. They think they 
are ju st as good as we are, and many 
of them  are.” Roosevelt’s patroniz­
ing remarks about Latin America 
fell on deaf ears that day, since 
none of the journalists present con­
sidered it worthy enough to report.
The “share” to which FDR 
referred encompassed both deci­
sion-making authority in inter- 
American economic debates as well 
as a portion of the wealth derived 
from the exploitation of Latin 
American natural resources, most of
Gonzalo Soruco teaches mass commu­
nication at the University of Mia mi. 
He is the author of The Cuban 
Exiles of Florida and the Mass 
Media: The Struggle of Culture 
(Gainesville: University Presses of 
Florida, forthcoming).
which went to US investors. FDR 
had good reasons for the new poli­
cy: the Great Depression had not yet 
abated in the US; Europe was at 
war; and the Axis powers were eye­
ing the markets of Latin America. 
The Latins themselves were showing 
some mettle in their disputes with 
Washington; Bolivia and Mexico 
had nationalized Standard Oil’s 
assets and were threatening to sell 
their energy resources to Germany 
andJapan.
The US press’s short-sighted 
view of Latin America has 
not changed much. Many 
newspaper editors still feel 
that the region is not worthy 
of serious press coverage.
Contrary to FDR’s wishes, US 
investors were in no mood to share 
anything with Latin America. In a 
letter to Josephus Daniels, then US 
ambassador to Mexico, Wall Street 
pundit Bernard Baruch voiced the 
investors’ concern. “I think we 
ought to help the poor peons of 
Mexico,” Baruch wrote, “but I am 
sure that the taking away of the 
American markets by the sweated 
labor of the Nazi and Fascist coun­
tries will destroy the labor standards 
in this country.”
It is unlikely that B aruch’s unkind 
reference to the people of Mexico 
—had journalists been aware of it— 
would have made it into the newspa­
pers. The US press in those days 
was largely oblivious, if no t con­
temptuous, of anything or anybody 
south of the border. In fact, the 
press was often the source of nega­
tive publicity surrounding Latin 
America.
T h e  P r e ss  a n d  t h e  S u m m it
Over five decades, the US press’s 
short-sighted view of Latin America 
has no t changed much. Many news­
paper editors still feel that the re­
gion is not worthy of serious press 
coverage. The Summit of the 
Americas held in Miami (December 
9-11, 1994) is a case in point. O f 
the 5,000 journalists covering the 
event, only a few were from the US; 
and while that handful included the 
entire White House press corps, few 
major newspapers m entioned the 
event. Moreover, none of the televi­
sion networks made a serious effort 
to cover the Summit. Brit Hum e of 
ABC News, for example, broadcast 
from the Summit’s International 
Media Center and reported about 
events in Bosnia. It is no t surprising 
then, that there are as many myths, 
stereotypes, and half-truths about 
Latin America in the pages of US 
newspapers today, as there were 
four, six, even eight decades ago.
O f course, one could argue that, 
historically, the US press has tended 
to ignore Latin America. Unable to 
understand and unwilling to learn 
about the complex tapestry of peo­
ples, cultures, and character that 
make up the Americas, the US press 
has often resorted to the stereotype, 
the catchy phrase, or superficial 
analysis of events in the region.
US newspaper reportage of the 
o ther Americas has always had a 
sensationalistic slant. Until a de­
cade ago, the region’s earthquakes, 
floods, and revolutions were the
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standard news fare that readers got 
from the US press. Crisis news, as 
these stories are called, featured col­
orful descriptions of the region’s 
poverty, its unhealthy living condi­
tions, or its tendency to civil unrest. 
More curren t coverage dwells on 
the war on drugs, cocaine, and drug 
trafficking. Regardless, this type of 
news coverage has the unfortunate 
tendency to reinforce stereotypes 
that readers hold about the region.
Small and less developed nations 
have always received the worst cov­
erage. Editorial cartoons portrayed 
them  as unruly children being suf­
fered by a tolerant and always 
benevolent Uncle Sam. Central 
American countries were often 
referred to as “banana republics” 
and their leaders as “tin horn  dicta­
tors.” Panama was depicted as a 
barefoot, mischievous, and heedless 
child playing with a can of gasoline, 
ever ready to start a fire. Nicaragua 
was the gun-toting baby whose cries 
kept Uncle Sam awake at night.
Though m ore distant, South 
America did not fare any better at 
the hands (or typewriters) of US 
journalists. Brazil was the place 
where European and North 
American villains sought sanctuary. 
Argentina was a Nazi haven. Bolivia 
was the amusing little country with 
two capitals and m ore attem pted 
coups than years of independence.
F r o m  C r isis  t o  D r u g s
Past and present coverage of 
Bolivia highlights the brief and 
superficial nature of US news. Its 
revolutionary history is rarely m en­
tioned anymore and crisis news is 
the exception rather than the rule, 
but the new trends are no better 
than those they replaced.
An analysis of news stories in The 
Atlanta Constitution, The Boston Globe, 
The Chicago Tribune, the Christian 
Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times, 
The New York Times, Washington Post, 
and Wall Street Journal suggests that 
US journalists and their editors have 
become more aware of Bolivia.
While mentions of the country were 
scarce ten years ago, the analysis 
shows that Bolivia made the papers 
on 427 occasions between January 
1989 and June 1994 in news stories, 
editorials, features, or in some other 
context. The num ber of appear­
ances places Bolivia ahead of 
Uruguay, Ecuador, and Paraguay 
and behind Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela in 
the US news. If newspaper editors 
employed dem ographic criteria, 
such as population size, to report on 
a country, Bolivia would be reason­
ably represented by these numbers.
In fact, editors’ criteria for what is 
news defy quick and easy explana­
tions. Im portant markets, politics, 
or issues that directly affect the US 
stimulate interest in varying 
degrees. Geographic proximity is 
im portant too. Mexico (a major 
trading partner of the US) made 
the headlines 8,837 times, more 
often than any other Latin 
American country. NAFTA and 
Chiapas, which have caused a great 
deal of concern in Washington, are 
undoubtedly reflected in these num ­
bers. El Salvador and Guatemala 
were m entioned 2,750 and 694 
times respectively, largely as a result 
of the insurgencies and the unfold­
ing peace processes in both coun­
tries. The Haitian crisis, followed 
by the stampede of refugees to 
Florida’s shores, got Haiti into the 
press 2,087 times.
The recent increase in coverage 
of Bolivia can be explained by the 
US obsession with the war on drugs 
in source countries. O f the 427 
news stories that m entioned Bolivia, 
42 percent were about the produc­
tion and trafficking of cocaine. In 
roughly half of those stories, the 
focus was on the effects of cocaine 
on crime, the economy, and corrup­
tion in the US, rather than on 
Bolivia itself. Each article elaborat­
ed, sometimes at length, on the role 
of Bolivia and its neighbors in pro­
ducing and distributing cocaine, 
and on the devastating effects of the 
drug on US society. Even when the 
story reported  on harmless aspects 
o f the coca leaf, such as its use in 
the innocuous beverage known as 
“mate de coca,” journalists found a 
way to work in comments on the 
dangers of cocaine addiction.
To be sure, Bolivia’s connection 
with drugs is overdone in the US 
press. O f the 2,200 news stories 
about Colombia published in the 
aforem entioned eight papers, 40 
percent were on cocaine trafficking 
and production, while only 20 per­
cent of the 1,450 stories about Peru 
were on the same topic. Yet both of 
these countries play a greater role 
in the production, transportation 
and sale of cocaine than Bolivia 
does. Bolivia is now the second 
largest producer of cocaine 
hydrochloride but has fallen to 
third place (behind Colombia) in 
the production of coca leaf.
The overstated connection 
between Bolivia and drugs is not 
limited to the papers surveyed 
above. A quick review of the Miami 
Herald's 1989-1993 database reveals 
that drugs and Bolivia appear in 16 
percent of the paper’s news stories;
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drugs and Colombia appear in 14 
percent of the news stories; and 
drugs and Peru appear in only eight 
percent of the news stories. These 
trends suggest that when editors 
assign reporters to write a story on 
Bolivia, the topic of drugs is implic­
itly included. Similarly, when the 
story is about drugs, editors call for 
an inclusion of Bolivia as one of the 
principal sources. Either way, the 
repeated connection of Bolivia with 
drugs is certain to affect US public 
opinion.
Who reports on Bolivia and on 
what topic is also a source of con­
cern. The newspapers m entioning 
Bolivia most often are The New York 
Times, followed by the Los Angeles 
Times, The Washington Post, and the 
Christian Science Monitor. At the bot­
tom of the list are The Wall Street 
Journal, The Chicago Tribune, The 
Boston Globe, and The Atlanta 
Constitution. O f these The 
Washington Post published the 
greatest proportion of stories (70 
percent) connecting Bolivia with 
drugs, followed by The Boston Globe 
(58 percent) and The Atlanta 
Constitution (45 percen t). The Wall 
Street Journal linked Bolivia and 
drugs in only eight percent of its 
stories. On the o ther hand, 24 per­
cent of The New York Times stories on 
Bolivia were on politics, while 31 
percent of the Journal s were about 
the economy.
The switch from crisis news to 
drug news in the reporting practices 
of US newspapers has several impli­
cations for Bolivia and other Latin 
American countries. As sources of 
crisis news, these countries were 
peripheral to US interests and secu­
rity; as such, they received little 
attention. Political instability and 
violence were largely a source of 
am usem ent to US readers. As the 
source of a drug that affects the 
daily lives of US citizens and their 
institutions, Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Peru have em erged onto a new and 
m ore ominous ground. ■
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Local Boy Makes Good
M aria Teresa Romero
F ollowing an exhaustive purge of the voter rolls, the period for declaring candidacy for the up­coming Peruvian presi­dential elections ended 
with a bang. O f the 27 preliminary 
groups aspiring to take part in the 
race, twelve were eliminated. The 
remaining fifteen will square off in 
the April 9 elections.
The most notable of the excluded 
parties was Agrupacion Siglo XXI, 
headed by Susana Higuchi, the 
estranged wife of the incum bent 
President Alberto Fujimori. Her 
candidacy was disqualified because 
she allegedly could not present the 
requisite num ber of signatures need­
ed to register her political organiza­
tion with the Jurado Nacional de 
Elecciones (JNE). Ms. Higuchi 
appealed the JN E’s decision and 
threatened to organize protest 
marches all over Peru, but the JNE 
left her out of the presidential race, 
and avoided ruling on the legality of 
her candidacy.
O f the twelve eligible parties, the 
presidential race is likely to come 
down to two candidates: President 
Fujimori of Cambio 90/Nueva 
Mayoria, and the form er Secretary 
General of the United Nations,
Javier Perez de Cuellar of Movimiento 
Union par el Peru. The power of the 
incumbency has allowed Fujimori, 
particularly since he began exercis­
ing extraordinary executive powers 
on April 5, 1992, to m ount a re-elec- 
tion campaign touting his two major 
achievements—the economic recov-
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ery and the pacification of the coun­
try—both of which have encouraged 
Peruvians to believe that they are 
headed for a period of some tran­
quillity.
Favoring Javier Perez de Cuellar is 
the generally negative view (held by 
60% of the poorest sectors, accord­
ing to one poll) of official economic 
adjustment policies, and, to a lesser 
extent, the perception that the gov­
ernm ent is not democratic. Perez 
de Cuellar has spent much of his 
time searching for solutions to 
poverty, attacking Fujimori’s authori­
tarianism, and advocating decentral­
ization of power.
Toledo seeks to replicate 
the Fujimori phenomenon.
One other candidate complicates 
the strategies of the two front run­
ners, muddying the electoral waters. 
This is Alejandro Toledo Manrique, 
who heads Pais Posible, a group of 
technocrats and entrepreneurs that 
could fill the political center. “El 
Cholo” Toledo, as he is popularly 
known in Peru, entered the compe­
tition in a surprising and even suspi­
cious way: unable to come up with 
enough signatures to make the first 
cut, he was subsequently drafted by 
the Coordinadora Democratica de Jose 
Barba Caballero, a party that was 
already registered, to be its presiden­
tial candidate. This turn of events 
stirred rum ors that Toledo’s candi­
dacy was nothing more than a 
Fujimori strategy to erode support 
for Perez de Cuellar, whose cam­
paign is the only real challenge to 
Fujimori.
This interpretation, which has 
been pushed mainly by Perez de 
Cuellar supporters, is viewed skepti­
cally by many Peruvian political ana­
lysts, who see Toledo’s candidacy as 
a threat to Fujimori. Certainly, the 
political profile of Toledo competes 
more with Fujimori than with Perez 
de Cuellar. Alejandro Toledo 
Manrique came from humble ori­
gins, but managed to get work and 
study abroad. A graduate of the 
University of San Francisco with 
some postgraduate work at Stanford 
(although his academic credentials 
are in some question) Toledo held 
im portant posts in international 
organizations and was a consultant 
to several governments. In other 
words, he is the “poor ‘cholo’ who 
trium phed abroad.” Moreover, he 
is a young man who is not linked to 
the political parties and who em­
ploys a populist rhetoric in his 
speeches calling for free education 
for the poor, better jobs and wages, 
and decentralization of the state. In 
short, Toledo seeks to replicate the 
Fujimori phenom enon.
It is doubtful that Toledo can win 
the election. Among other factors 
reducing his chances, he is not well 
known outside of Lima, and does 
not have sufficient resources to ade­
quately finance his campaign. How­
ever, he could place third in a way 
that would threaten both Fujimori 
and Perez de Cuellar. A late 1994 
poll gave Toledo a 61% favorable 
rating among Lima residents, where 
elections are usually decided. Re­
gardless of the outcome, “el Cholo” 
Toledo adds some spice to the elec­
toral scene in Peru, and has forced 
each of the twelve candidates to 
specify the content and message of 
their programs and proposals. ■
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Balseros in Limbo
Carmelo Mesa-Lago
A pproximately every 15 years Fidel Castro opens the island’s gates and allows thousands of desper­ate Cubans to emi­grate to the U nited States: 5,000 
from the Port of Camarioca in 1965,
125,000 from Mariel in 1980, and 
more than 32,000 from Cojimar and 
many other shores between August 
and Septem ber of 1994. Prior to 
the latest exodus, Cubans were 
granted parolee status as political 
refugees and became eligible for 
perm anent US residence after two 
years. Clinton dramatically changed 
the previous policies and interned 
the emigrants in military camps at 
Guantanam o Naval Base and in 
Panama. Only 3 percent of the emi­
grants in two US camps, having suc­
cessfully reached American shores, 
were thereby eligible for parole.
A nother im portant difference is 
that, in the two previous exoduses, 
emigrants were picked up in Cuba 
by Cuban-Americans who had sailed 
from US shores. In 1994, the emi­
grants fled in rudim entary rafts (bal­
sas) risking their lives in the Straits 
of Florida. Ironically, the most 
heroic emigrants were not rewarded 
with freedom  and entry into the 
land of honey but im prisoned in 
detention camps under terrible con-
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ditions. The dem ographic features 
of these different waves of emi­
grants diverged as well: balseros were 
overwhelmingly male (81% of the 
total) and young (86% under 40 
years old). Hence the majority is 
composed of those who were born 
and raised under the revolution, a 
clear indication of the failure of 
socialism and the alienation of the 
youth. The 1994 exodus is also 
im portant because it took place 
under the devastating economic 
crisis that has afflicted Cuba in the 
1990s, and followed the massive 
anti-government riots in Havana 
which occurred on August 5— the 
first under the Revolution. Because 
of these precarious political-eco- 
nomic conditions, it was initially 
feared that the balsero exodus would 
surpass all previous records.
In a TV presentation on 
August 11, Castro rejected 
any possible negotiations 
on the exodus unless the 
US embargo was lifted.
Finally, Cuba’s emigration wave 
occurred at the worst time for 
President Clinton and the city of 
Miami. Popular support for the 
president was at its lowest ebb, and 
he was in the midst of preparing a 
reluctant Congress for an invasion 
of Haiti. In the November elec­
tions, the Democratic governor of 
Florida faced a powerful challenge 
from Republican Jeb  Bush, who has 
close ties to the conservative sectors 
of Miami’s Cuban community. The
city of Miami was counting on the 
the December Summit of the 
Americas, attended by all democrati­
cally elected heads of state in the 
hem isphere, to help erase the 
adverse effects caused by crime on 
the lucrative tourist industry. These 
factors shaped US and Cuban posi­
tions vis-a-vis the exodus, the negoti­
ations, the bilateral agreem ent, and 
its aftermath.
C a st r o  O p e n s  t h e  G a tes  A g a in
In a shrewd political manipula­
tion, an enraged Castro addressed 
Cuba on national TV (also broad­
cast by CNN) and blam ed the US 
for the Havana riots. He accused 
the US governm ent of backing a 
“subversive p lan” to prom ote chaos 
in the island. Tools of that plan 
were the “blockade” (an economic 
embargo imposed in 1961, and 
tightened in 1982 and 1992) and 
the reduction in legal visas granted 
to Cubans (the 1984 migration 
agreem ent, signed during the 
Reagan administration, stipulated a 
maximum of 20,000 annual visas), 
while stimulating illegal departures 
and hijackings of vessels.
Figures supplied by Cuba and the 
US Immigration and Naturalization 
Service show that, in 1990, 83% of 
arrivals had legal visas (2,274) while 
17% (466) were illegal; such pro­
portions shifted to 31% legal 
(1,873) and 69% (4,169) illegal in
1993. Between June 4 and August 
25, thirteen Cuban vessels were 
seized by desperate Cubans and 
taken to the United States; 41 died 
when their vessel was sunk by gun­
fire from Cuban coast guards, and 
two Cuban officers also died in the 
hijackings. Castro threatened to 
remove all obstacles to migration
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Exodus redux
unless the US stopped encouraging 
illegal departures. He did precisely 
that, and the num ber of balseros 
climbed from 156 on August 13 to a 
peak of 3,253 on the 23rd. In a TV 
presentation on August 11, Castro 
rejected any possible negotiations 
on the exodus unless the US em bar­
go was lifted.
C l in t o n  C o u n t e r s
Clinton charged that the causes of 
both the riot and the exodus were 
Castro’s disastrous economic poli­
cies com bined with the lack of 
democracy, political freedoms, and 
hum an rights. He pledged that 
Castro would not dictate US immi­
gration policy. US immigration offi­
cials argued that the 20,000 visas 
were not a m andatory quota but a 
maximum, and that the low num ber 
of visas actually granted was due to 
the fact that few Cuban-Americans 
requested them  for their relatives. 
Clinton ordered the US Coast 
Guard to detain any vessel depart­
ing from or returning to US shores 
with Cubans, and set severe sanc­
tions for the violators; both actions 
effectively im peded another Mariel- 
type exodus. He also ordered that 
all rafters be intercepted by the US 
Coast Guard and taken to 
Guantanam o detention camps or 
other “safe havens” (eventually 
Panam a); those detained would 
never be allowed to en ter the US, 
unless they went back to Cuba and 
applied for a visa there.
This measure provoked strong 
opposition from Cuban exiles who 
claimed that Clinton was penalizing 
the victims instead of Castro. The 
president m et with the governor of 
Florida, Miami officials and Jorge 
Mas Canosa, the chairperson of the
powerful Cuban-American National 
Foundation (CANF). Mas advised 
Clinton to be tough with Castro: 
ban all dollar remittances and trips 
to and from Cuba by exiles and 
their relatives, and impose a naval 
blockade of the island. Except for 
the blockade, Clinton followed that 
advice, and increased Radio Marti 
transmissions to Cuba. The day the 
num ber of rafters peaked, Leon 
Panetta declared that the blockade 
option was under consideration. 
There were rum ors that the Summit 
would be moved from Miami to 
Washington DC, and any Clinton 
initiative on Haiti was paralyzed.
The day the number of 
rafters peaked, Leon 
Panetta declared that 
the blockade option was 
under consideration.
Surprisingly, Castro was silent for 
two weeks while C linton’s tough 
measures were announced and 
im plemented. On August 24,
Castro reappeared on Cuban TV 
with his attitude dramatically 
changed from threatening to concil­
iatory. He stated that it was not his 
purpose to hu rt Clinton or the 
Democrats, and com plained that 
the US president had done the 
exact opposite of what he, Castro, 
had suggested (and not anticipat­
ed) : tightening the embargo, autho­
rizing m ore radio transmissions, and 
leveling the threat of a naval block­
ade. Castro, and the Cuban journal­
ists who posed bland questions to
him, referred to the adverse effects 
o f both C linton’s measures and the 
exodus, such as negative coverage 
by the international news media, 
and the risks for both countries in 
continuing along the path of con­
frontation. (Nevertheless the 
Maximum Leader did not m ention 
what were probably the worst effects 
of the unstable situation he had cre­
ated with the exodus: a significant 
decline in tourism and a chill in for­
eign investment.) Finally, Castro 
dropped his previous dem and that 
bilateral negotiations be tied to the 
embargo issue and agreed to discuss 
only migration issues.
T h e  M ig r a t io n  A g r eem e n t
The conversations were held in 
New York from Septem ber 1-9 in 
the midst of significant polarization. 
Conservative groups of Cuban exiles 
(but no t the CANF) dem onstrated 
against the talks and in support of 
the embargo, and dem anded a 
naval blockade of the island. 
Conversely, the US liberal press, top 
Democrat congresspersons, a few 
groups of Cuban exiles, and Cuba’s 
Catholic bishops along with some 
dissident groups requested the 
embargo either be lifted or includ­
ed as an issue in the negotiations. 
There where a few surprises:
Bernard Aronson, President Bush’s 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, and conservative 
columnist William Buckley jo ined  
the second group.
The US team, led by Michael 
Skol, offered to effectively grant
20,000 visas annually (a key point 
in Castro’s criticism) but Ricardo 
Alarcon, head of the Cuban team, 
dem anded 100,000. Alarcon also 
pushed for both the US embargo
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and C linton’s economic sanctions to 
be included in the talks, but he was 
rebuffed by Skol. The Cuban chief 
negotiator then reduced his 
dem and to 28,000 visas and US 
recognition that the embargo was a 
major cause of the exodus, but 
none of these requests was granted. 
With no immediate settlement in 
sight, Alarcon flew back to Havana 
for what was predicted would be 
several days of consultations with 
Castro. Surprisingly, he returned 
to New York in less than 24 hours 
and signed the agreem ent on 
Septem ber 9.
According to the bilateral agree­
ment, Cuba would take effective 
measures, using mainly “persuasive 
m ethods,” to stop “unsafe depar­
tures.” The US, in turn, agreed to 
impede entrance to (a) rafters 
already in or going to camps outside 
the US (who would then have to 
re tu rn  to Cuba in order to apply for 
a US visa); and (b) emigrants who 
depart through other “irregular" 
(illegal) ways. In addition, the US 
would grant a m inim um  of 20,000 
visas to Cubans without relatives in 
the US, plus an additional num ber 
of visas to those with immediate rel­
atives or who were currently on wait­
ing lists. Both countries agreed to 
cooperate to prevent illegal migra­
tion and hijacking of vessels, and to 
arrange a return  for the voluntary 
re tu rn  of balseros.
The Cuban governm ent effective­
ly halted the exodus, which 
declined from 1,000 on September 
11 to zero in four days. The US 
enacted rules on October 12 for 
granting visas to five categories of 
Cubans. They included broader 
definitions of political refugees or 
eligibility for family reunification, 
and a lottery for those who do not 
qualify for o ther categories.
B a l s e r o s : T h e  B ig  L o ser s
The awful conditions in 
G uantanam o’s camps have been 
confirmed by the Catholic Church,
hum an rights organizations, Cuban 
exiles, and the news media. The 
camps are surrounded by barbed 
wire (although the MPs do not 
carry guns); many of the detained 
children are sick; there is no run­
ning water in some camps and what 
water is available is always warm; 
and the migrants are crowded in 
tents with dirt floors, dusty and lack­
ing in privacy. Worse than the phys­
ical conditions is the sense of impo­
tence and loss of hope. By mid- 
October, some 1,000 Cubans had 
expressed a desire to return  and 
about 50 had done so. Thousands 
escaped briefly and a couple died in 
the attempt. These conditions led 
to severe criticism and protests from 
the migrants and many groups out­
side, particularly Cuban-Americans. 
Conditions in the Panamanian
The balseros were the 
big losers; they risked their 
lives only to end up in 
detention camps under 
awful living conditions.
camps were considerably improved; 
nonetheless, a riot and escape 
attempts resulted in some casualties.
To improve conditions in 
Guantanamo, an om budsm an (a 
Cuban-American) was appointed, 
and a timetable for specific 
improvements was publicized. 
Several of those measures material­
ized but the ombudsman stepped 
down after three m onths on the job. 
Clinton eventually yielded (at least 
partially) to the pressure and criti­
cism and announced that unaccom ­
panied children, those over 70 years 
of age, and the chronically sick 
would be granted admission to the 
United States. These three groups 
represented less than 1 percent of 
the total migrants in the camps, but
this step raised hope that the door 
might be open for others to be 
freed.
The impact of the exodus on both 
the governm ent and people of the 
United States and Cuba is summa­
rized in the inset. Clinton was able 
to stop the exodus and get political 
support at hom e but at the cost of 
significant ethical and political con­
cessions. Castro scored some 
im portant political points (US sup­
port to im pede illegal departures 
and hijackings), but suffered eco­
nomically and got additional sanc­
tions. He also lost face by settling 
for considerably less than he initial­
ly dem anded (including the lifting 
of the em bargo). US taxpayers paid 
the cost of rescues at sea and will 
foot the bill for the detention camps 
and forthcom ing legal immigrants. 
The balseros were the big losers; they 
risked their lives only to end up in 
detention camps under awful living 
conditions. A trickle of Cubans will 
be lucky to leave their tragic island 
with US visas in the future, but the 
overwhelming majority will be worse 
off than before the exodus due to 
C linton’s economic sanctions.
L in g e r in g  P r o b l e m s
The agreem ent touches sensible 
issues and leaves some points unan­
swered. The US hopes that Cubans 
who try to escape through “irregu­
lar” ways will be “persuaded” not to 
leave and treated in a hum ane m an­
ner. What is the US going to do if 
Castro uses force and incarcerates 
the violators?
Yielding to pressure, Clinton has 
already infringed on the agreem ent 
by freeing some of the rafters de­
tained in G uantanam o’s camps and 
he has promised Cuban exiles that 
o ther groups will be allowed to 
enter the US in the future. Such a 
breach could provide an incentive 
for Cubans to leave illegally (as 
detention in Guantanam o would 
cease to be a deterrent) or provide 
Castro with an excuse to suspend
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the agreem ent and open the gates 
for another wave of emigration. On 
the o ther hand, if the bulk of rafters 
is m aintained in detention in 
Guantanamo, an increasing num ber 
of them will ask to return  home, 
and the likelihood of riots will 
increase. The Cuban government 
has already said it cannot re-absorb 
all the detainees, and has reserved 
the right to authorize each case 
individually. Those who manage to 
re tu rn  will have neither a house nor 
a job, and the governm ent or zeal­
ous militants might treat them 
harshly: actions which would pro­
voke irritation and protests in the 
US.
The US has enacted regulations 
for the im plementation of the 
agreem ent and created new and 
broader categories of eligible 
Cubans (including a lottery) for 
immigration visas; the US Interest 
Section in Havana has also increased 
its personnel. Despite these facilita­
tions, the minimum quota of 20,000 
annual visas might not be met, giv­
ing Castro a chance to charge the 
US with violating the agreement.
If the economic deterioration 
continues and other riots or hijack­
ings occur, Castro might open the 
safety valve again to export the dis­
content and divert attention from 
domestic trouble. It is true that he 
would pay a costly economic price 
for another exodus, but he might 
extract additional political conces­
sions. In spite of his weakness, the 
aging autocrat is remarkably 
resilient and the 1994 exodus may 
no t be the last, unless the regime is 
overthrown and the direction of the 
migratory wave is reversed. ■
This article is a partial version of a 
much larger work in progress. The 
author acknowledges the valuable aid 
of Francisco Santeiro.
I m p a c t  o f  t h e  E x o d u s  o n  t h e  U n it e d  S t a t e s
Positive for the government. Clinton reacted firmly and ultimately stopped the exodus, 
freeing him to occupy Haiti. He successfully supported Governor Lawton Chiles’ (D-FL) 
November re-election bid and avoided moving the Summit to Washington. Neither Latin 
American heads of state nor Cuban-Americans created problems during the Summit. 
Clinton did not reverse economic sanctions against Castro, and rejected a discussion on 
non-migration issues (e.g. the embargo). His policies were approved by a majority of the 
American people (including many in Florida) who are increasingly opposed to illegal 
immigration. Clinton also got the support of the conservative and powerful CANF.
Negative for the government. In spite of Clinton’s claim that Castro wouldn’t dictate 
immigration policy, he ended up doing so. The naval blockade of Cuba was threatened 
and dien swiftly withdrawn. Clinton stopped treating rafters as heroes, and joined Castro 
to stop them from leaving. He also began prosecuting hijackers. He yielded to Castro’s 
request for increased legal immigration. He became the target of human rights groups 
inside and outside Cuba for sending balseros to Guantanamo and collaborating with 
Castro. Cubans in Panamanian camps have rioted, and those in Guantanamo are a risk 
for rebellion and showcase of discontent.
Positive for US taxpayers. Residents of Miami and Florida avoided massive, rapid, and 
unscreened immigration similar to that of Mariel.
Negative for US taxpayers. Inflow of future legal immigrants will increase pressure on 
Florida's crowded schools and hospitals. After a period of federal aid. the state and the 
city of Miami will have to keep immigrants who are neither self-supporting nor have rela­
tives. Taxpayers will continue to finance camps in Guantanamo and other safe havens.
I m p a c t  o f  t h e  E x o d u s  o n  C u b a
Positive for the government. Castro shifted world attention from the economic crisis and 
political riots in Havana to the US embargo as the cause of the exodus. He forced the US 
to change a 28-year-old Cuban immigration policy and support him in repressing illegal 
departures and hijacking. He opened a safety valve for 31,500 malcontents and will 
expand it by at least 20,000 legal migrants annually. He divided the exile community on 
two issues: the admission of rafters into the US and the question of US-Cuban talks.
Negative for the government. The US embargo is still on and new sanctions are causing 
economic and political damage, at least temporarily. The crisis also harmed tourism and 
investment. Castro and Alarcon drastically reduced initial demands and settled for con­
siderably less, e.g.. 20,000 instead of 100,000 visas, no lifting of Clinton’s sanctions, and no 
discussion of the embargo. The Revolution’s image was further damaged by the specta­
cle of 31,500 people, mostly young, leaving Cuba regardless of enormous risks (revealing 
that, in spite of dire conditions, detention in Guantanamo was preferable to staying in 
Cuba).
Positive for Cuban population. 31,500 were able to leave Cuba and at least 20,000 more 
should receive legal visas annually in the future, with broader definitions of who is eligi­
ble for political refugee status, a visa, or for family unification.
Negative for Cuban population. Many rafters died at sea; those who survived are de­
tained in camps in Guantanamo and Panama, and can’t apply for entry to the US, but 
must return to Cuba and apply for a legal visa there. The 28-year-old policy of special 
treatment that allowed refugees to enter the US and become residents was terminated. 
Cubans on the island lost remittances and visits from exiled relatives. Rafters’ wives and 
children left behind in Cuba are in a worse situation than before the exodus. ■
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Moving Beyond Personalism
Orlando J. Perez
n May 8, 1994 
Panamanians elected 
a new president, two 
vice presidents, 71 
legislators, 511 com­
munity representa­
tives, and 67 mayors. For Panama, 
these elections constituted an 
im portant step toward building a 
democratic system of government. 
They were the first in the history of 
Panama to be held under a political 
context prom oting free and compet­
itive elections.
Panam a’s structure of government 
and its political party system offer 
obstacles to the development and 
consolidation of pluralistic institu­
tions. The nation still operates 
under the 1972 Constitution, 
reform ed in 1978 and 1983, which 
was the product and instrum ent of 
the military regimes. To bring the 
Constitution more in line with the 
needs of a democratic government, 
a set of reforms was submitted to 
the electorate in 1992. Eventually 
defeated at the polls, the package 
included a prohibition on the rais­
ing of an army; revisions to the elec­
toral procedures for members of 
Congress; increased autonomy for 
the Electoral Tribunal; and curbs on 
the power of the Controller 
General. Consequently, there has 
been a growing movement to con­
voke a Constituent Assembly to draft 
an entirely new document. While 
this may ultimately occur, the 1994 
elections took place under the exist­
ing charter. The Constitution
Orlando J. Perez is visiting assistant pro­
fessor of political science at the University 
of Kansas at Lawrence.
requires only a simple plurality for 
election as president. With seven 
candidates, this allowed the candi­
date with a third of the votes to win.
The political context may be con­
ducive to free and competitive elec­
tions, but the weakness of the politi­
cal party system is an obstacle to 
democratic consolidation. Political 
parties in Panama represent narrow 
economic interests rather than 
broad popular sectors. Given the 
unrepresentative nature of political 
parties, political competition 
revolves around personalities.
The Constitution requires that all 
candidates for the Legislative 
Assembly be on a list of approved 
parties. In districts having only one 
legislator, a simple plurality is 
enough to win, but in others, such 
as metropolitan Panama City, which 
elects several legislators, the final 
result is based on a complicated for­
mula involving party lists and modi­
fied proportional representation. 
The result is virtually to guarantee a 
divided Assembly in which the party 
that wins the executive has a minori­
ty in the legislature. The Constitu­
tion was designed to inhibit the 
independence of all branches of 
government, leaving the military 
and its party allies as the ultimate 
m oderating powers.
But with the elimination of the 
military, there is no final arbiter, so 
the system is characterized by grid­
lock, partisanship, and instability. 
The ability of the new government 
to reduce these tendencies will 
determ ine if the 1994 elections were 
an opportunity, or an opportunity 
lost. Moreover, this administration 
will be responsible for managing the 
transfer of the Panama Canal and 
the military bases from the United
States to Panama. Most Panam an­
ians recognize that their success or 
failure in dealing with this will play 
a determ inant role in shaping the 
nation’s economic and political 
future.
T h e  E l e c t o r a l  T r ib u n a l
The institution empowered by the 
Constitution to set up the electoral 
process is the Electoral Tribunal.
The Tribunal is composed of three 
magistrates, one appointed by the 
Executive, one by the Supreme 
Court, and a third by the National 
Legislative Assembly. Members 
serve 10-year terms, and are charged 
with regulating the activities of polit­
ical parties and candidates. They set 
up the timetable for the registra­
tion of political parties, candidates, 
and voters. The Tribunal was also 
given authority over the Fuerza 
Publica (the police force) six days 
before the elections and up to the 
official proclamation of the 
President-Elect.
The voting process was organized 
around five ballots: one for presi­
dent and vice president, one for the 
legislature, one for mayor, one for 
community representative, and one 
for councilmen (only a few districts 
elect councilmen). The Electoral 
Tribunal has the authority to 
appoint all electoral corporations 
for the purpose of counting the 
votes. At the polling place, each 
“mesa” is organized with three offi­
cials. From each individual polling 
place the ballots are then distrib­
uted to the various Counting 
Boards. The National Counting 
Board counts the votes for president 
and vice president. The Legislative 
District (“Circuito”) Counting Board 
counts the votes for the legislature.
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Panama inches toward electoral democracy
The District Counting Board is 
responsible for the votes for mayor, 
and the Community Counting 
Board does the same for Council­
m en and Community representative.
P a r ties  a n d  A llia n c es
Twenty-two political parties initial­
ly requested legal recognition from 
the Electoral Tribunal in order to 
participate in the 1994 elections.
The Electoral Code requires those 
who want to register as political par­
ties to present 18,500 signatures to 
the Tribunal. By the beginning of 
the electoral process in November 
of 1993, the Tribunal had recog­
nized 16 of them  as political parties 
(see inset). The law requires each 
party to receive at least five percent 
of the valid votes for president, legis­
lator, or community representative 
in order to survive as a legal politi­
cal entity.
O f these, only the Revolutionary 
Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, 
the Authentic Liberal, the Christian 
Democrats, the Liberal Republican 
Nationalist Movement, and the 
Nationalist Popular Party had previ­
ously been involved in an electoral 
process. The Arnulfista Party had 
participated before but under a dif­
ferent name and leadership.
Panamanian law allows political 
parties to form alliances in order to 
contest national elections. In fact, 
Panamanian electoral politics have 
traditionally been structured around 
such alliances. Seldom have these 
electoral alliances, however, been 
constructed on the basis of political 
ideology or even programmatic 
agreement. The contestation of the 
election and the partition of power 
afterwards have been the raison 
d ’etre of Panamanian electoral
alliances. The 1994 elections were 
no exception. Four such alliances 
were form ed for the 1994 elections 
(see inset).
T h e  C a m pa ig n
During the first few m onths after 
the official opening of campaign 
season (November 8, 1993), the 
concern of most political parties was 
to find a presidential candidate and 
to build a viable electoral alliance. 
According to the electoral code, par­
ties had until February 8, 1994 to 
nom inate candidates. It therefore 
became vital for all alliances to be 
settled by that date.
The official campaign began on 
February 8, 1994. Both Change ‘94 
and the Democratic Alliance (repre­
senting candidates who had served 
in the Endara governm ent and had 
vigorously opposed the Noriega 
regime) attem pted to re-play the 
1989 elections—that elections were 
a choice between a return  to the 
militarist past or the consolidation 
of a democratic system. Groups that 
had been involved in the National 
Civic Crusade made much of the 
links between Perez Balladares and 
the Noriega regime and, until the 
very last, attem pted to build a 
“Grand Civilian Alliance” to defeat 
the PRD (Revolutionary 
Democratic Party). Those efforts 
failed partly because of the intransi­
gence of the various actors involved 
in those negotiations, and partly 
because the “civilian vs. militarist” 
dichotomy no longer mobilized the 
electorate. The voters were more 
concerned with their immediate 
problems of unemployment and 
poverty. Labels and attacks that had 
succeeded in 1989 in the midst of 
an economic crisis and a repressive
1994 P o l i t i c a l  P a r t ie s
Arnulfista
Authentic Liberal
Christian Democratic Party
Civilian Renewal
Doctrinaire Panamenista Party
Independent Democratic Union
Labor
Liberal
Liberal Republican 
Liberal Republican 
Nationalist Movement 
National Mission of Unity 
Nationalist Popular Party 
National Renovation Movement 
Papa Egoro
Revolutionary Democratic Party 
Solidarity
1994 E l e c t o r a l  A l l i a n c e s
United People’s Alliance:
Revolutionary Democratic Party 
Labor
Liberal Republican Party
Democratic Alliance:
Arnulfista
Liberal
Authentic Liberal 
Independent Democratic Union
Change ‘94:
Liberal Republican 
Nationalist Movement 
Civilian Renewal 
National Renovation Movement
National Concertation Alliance:
Solidarity
National Mission of Unity
The remaining parties did not 
participate in formal alliances.
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military regime, could not work in 
a context in which there was no 
National Guard, no dictatorship, no 
immediate national crisis, and no 
clear preference from the US 
regarding the candidates.
The PRD obviously took advan­
tage of this situation to present 
themselves as a new democratic 
party, no longer tied to the military. 
Its campaign centered around the 
immediate problems of the elec­
torate, attem pting to present con­
crete answers to the problems of 
unem ploym ent and poverty. While 
somewhat superficial, it was the only 
consistently positive campaign, and 
the only one to speak in terms of 
programs.
Both the Change ‘94 and the 
Democratic Alliance campaigns 
alternated between negative attacks 
on the PRD and superficial atten­
tion to the nation’s problems. 
Toward the end, it was the Change 
‘94 campaign, led by Ruben Carles, 
that sponsored most of the attacks.
It also orchestrated a negative attack 
on the Ruben Blades campaign 
when it became clear that Blades 
was moving ahead of Carles in the 
polls. The campaign, aided by the 
tabloid El Siglo, accused Blades of 
being a closet communist, as well as 
a closet supporter of the military 
regime. In the end, the negative 
campaign may have had some 
effect, scaring away some of Blades’s 
potential support.
Two major phenom ena ultimately 
shaped the electoral process: First, 
the fragmentation of the so-called 
“civilian” forces and their inability to 
make militarism a major campaign 
theme; second, the ability of the 
PRD to present themselves as a real 
and legitimate alternative. The 
organizational power of the PRD 
and the Arnulfista parties helped 
make them the two most popular 
parties, while a shortage of money 
and organization hindered Blades’s 
attem pt to present himself as the 
“outsider. ”
C o n c l u s io n  
While the post-invasion govern­
m ent has made significant progress 
toward institutionalizing a dem ocra­
tic regime, many problems remain. 
The 1994 elections may well be the 
most im portant in the nation’s his­
tory. That they were free, honest 
and peaceful, and not subject to sig­
nificant degrees of foreign influ­
ence, represents a step forward in 
the nation’s evolution towards a 
m ore democratic state and society. 
At the same time, the continuation
of social fragm entation and high 
levels of public cynicism cloud 
prospects for the new government. 
In some ways, Panam a’s problems 
pale when com pared to those of 
such nearby states as Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, or even 
Colombia. But, in another sense, 
historical patterns of behavior and 
beliefs could deal away Panam a’s 
best hopes for a prosperous and 
peaceful future; this should be the 
subject of concern inside and out­
side Panama. ■
T a b l e  1: P r e s id e n t ia l  E l e c t io n  R e s u l t s
Candidates Votes Percentage
Ernesto Perez Balladares (United People's Alliance) 355,307 33.3
Mireya de Gruber (Democratic Alliance) 310,372 29.1
Ruben Blades (Papa Egoro) 182,405 17.1
Ruben Carles (Change ‘94) 171,192 16.1
Eduardo Vallarino (Christian Democrat) 25,476 2.4
Samuel L. Galindo (National Concertation Alliance) 18,424 1.7
Jose S. Munoz (Doctrinaire Panamanian Party) 3,668 0.3
TOTAL 1,066,844 100.0
Source: Electoral Tribunal
T a b l e  2: N a t io n a l  A s se m b l y  R e s u l t s  b y  P o l it ic a l  P a r t y
Political Party Seats
P R D .............................................................................................................................31
A rnulfista................................................................................................................... 14
Papa Egoro .................................................................................................................6
MOLIRENA .............................................................................................................. 5
Authentic Liberal ..................................................................................................... 4
Civilian R en ew a l........................................................................................................3
L ib e ra l..........................................................................................................................3
S olidarity ..................................................................................................................... 2
Republican L ib e ra l ....................................................................................................1
Labor P a r ty ................................................................................................................. 1
Christian D em ocrat....................................................................................................1
MORENA ....................................................................................................................1
TOTAL ..................................................................................................................... 72
Source: Electoral Tribunal
Numbers may vary as legal challenges are resolved by the Electoral Tribunal.
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DANCE, MYTH, AND RITUAL: THE AMERICAS
A n  In tern a tio n a l  C o n fe r e n c e  C elebra tin g  t h e  3 0 t h
A nniversary o f  t h e  C ongress o n  R esea rch  in  D a n c e
November 2-5, 1995
Hosted by
NWSA INDAMI
New World School of the Arts Intercultural Dance and Music Institute
M iami, Florida Florida International University
The conference will bring together artists, educators, and 
scholars who will address dance, myth, and ritualfrom  
a variety o f perspectives, including anthropology, 
sociology, history, literature, ethnomusicology, popular 
culture, gender studies, aesthetics, and criticism.
Keynote Speakers Include:
Veve Clark, Associate Professor of African and Caribbean Literature, 
University of California, Berkeley, author of The Legend of Maya Deren.
Allegra Fuller-Snyder, Professor Emeritus and Director, Graduate Program in Dance 
Ethnology, UCLA, Director of “Bayaniha,” an award-winning documentary on Filipino dance.
JoAnn Kealiihonomoku, Executive Director of Cross-Cultural Dance Resources, dance anthropologist, 
and author of numerous publications on Pacific, Native and African American dance cultures.
Rex Netdeford, Full Professor, University of the West Indies, Artistic Director of 
National Dance Theatre Company of Jamaica, author o f Dance Jamaica, Roots and Rhythms.
Sally Price, Social Anthropologist, author of Primitive Art in Civilized Places, Caribbean Contours.
Edith Turner, Professor of Anthropology, University of Virginia, author of The Spirit and the Drum, Experiencing Ritual.
For more information, contact:
Dr. Andrea Mantell-Seidel, Director or Suzanne T. Duncan, Program Coordinator 
Intercultural Dance and Music Institute • Latin American and Caribbean Center 
Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199
(305) 348-2894/FAX (305) 348-3593
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Drugs and Kisses
While it all appeared to be hugs 
and kisses at the Summit of the 
Americas, the drug issue still divides 
the U nited States and Latin 
America. Weeks before the Summit, 
the US tried to get Andean delega­
tions to sign a controversial 40 page 
addendum  (to the Plan of Action) 
on anti-narcotics strategy. When 
faced with the prospect of a hotly 
contested Summit agenda, 
Washington pulled back and agreed 
to the watered down anti-narcotics 
declaration released on December 
11. Bolivian sources claim that 
Washington wanted to condition 
trade agreem ents in progress with 
anti-narcotics initiatives.
Cuba Looks Down Under
On October 10, Spanish news ser­
vices reported  that Australia’s 
Western Mining Corporation will 
invest approximately US$500 million 
in a jo in t enterprise with Cuba’s 
Commercial Caribbean Nickel S.A. 
to prospect, explore, and exploit 
nickel deposits in Cuba’s Oriente 
province. The Australian firm will 
have a 65% share in the project ver­
sus Cuba’s 35%. The jo in t enter­
prise expects to explore and exploit 
the Pinares del Mayari region, 
where it is estimated that 37% of 
the world’s nickel reserves are locat­
ed. This is the second such deal 
signed by the Cubans; in June the 
Com pam a General de Niquel S.A. 
and the Sherritt Incorporated 
signed a similar agreement.
Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra 
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Huizenga on the Move
Long before renting videos became 
popular in the U nited States, Latin 
Americans were spending their 
weekends in front of VCRs. This 
Latin American preference will now 
enjoy a m ore competitive atmos­
phere. According to a report in the 
Miami Herald (October 11, 1994), 
Blockbuster Entertainm ent Group, 
owned by Viacom, licensed Video 
Chile S.A. to open 75 video outlets 
in Argentina in 1995. According to 
Ramon M artin Busitill, the move 
was prom pted by Blockbuster’s suc­
cess in Chile and Venezuela and the 
potential video market in Argentina.
Sorry Charlie
Colombia is again attem pting to 
decipher free m arket messages from 
the United States. Pressure from 
US flower distributors led the US 
D epartm ent of Commerce to levy a 
22.7% tariff on cut flowers from 
Colombia. Colombian tuna was 
recently excluded from the US mar­
ket because that country’s fisher­
men are not doing enough to pre­
vent the killing of dolphins. In 
1992, similar restrictions were 
imposed only to be lifted a year 
later. According to the Colombian 
Cham ber of Fisheries, the US 
should develop norm s that are not 
based on “false ecological criteria 
that only shelter US economic inter­
ests.”
War of the Pacific, Part II
Bolivians and Chileans appear to be 
re-fighting the War of the Pacific via 
the inform ation superhighway. 
Throughout October, newsgroup
users on the In ternet engaged in a 
nationalistic free for all over the 
scheduled perform ance of two 
Chilean musical groups (“Bafochi” 
and “Inti Illimani”) at Lisner 
Auditorium in Washington, DC. 
According to Bolivian In ternet 
users, Bafochi was playing Bolivian 
folklore ranging from Aymara to 
Guarani Indian music without rec­
ognizing its origin. O n the 
Internet, Chilean nationals claimed 
that the music and dances—diabla- 
da, llamerada, taquirari, cullawada, 
am ong others—were from N orthern 
Chile. Threatened with the 
prospect of a picket line of Bolivian 
residents at their residence in the 
DC area, Bafochi withdrew those 
pieces from their perform ance. Inti 
Illimani, on the o ther hand, recog­
nized the Bolivian origin of the 
music they perform ed and noted 
that one of its founding members is 
a Bolivian.
Highway Robbery?
The New York Times Business Day 
(November 12, 1994) reports that 
private contractors are building 
highways across South America at 
an unprecedented rate and scale. 
With funding from multilateral 
agencies continually falling, govern­
ments are turning to the private sec­
tor to build transportation infra­
structure. In return, the contrac­
tors retain the right to levy tolls. 
Mexico’s new 3,000 mile toll road 
system is a prime example of such 
projects. At the end of 1994, the 
Brazilian governm ent began enter­
taining bids for a 265 mile highway 
to run  between Rio and Sao 
Paulo—an estimated $ 1 billion 
investment. On November 20, the
FTimes published a response from 
one individual who was less than 
enthusiastic about private compa­
nies profiting from national infra­
structure projects. The irate reader 
labeled it simple “highway robbery.”
Mercosur v. NAFTA
Timed to coincide with the 
December 1994 Summit of the 
Americas, Arthur Andersen & Co. 
released an im portant survey of 
future hemispheric business trends. 
Among the findings: most business 
executives in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, and Venezuela still think 
the US is their most im portant mar­
ket, but expect this to change short­
ly. A significant portion of those 
interviewed predicted that trade 
am ong South American countries 
would soon be more im portant than 
trade between their countries and 
members of NAFTA. Starting 
January 1, 1995, 90% of trade 
between the four Mercosur coun­
tries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay)—which account for 
two-thirds of South America’s eco­
nomic activity—became duty-free.
Un Whopper o Dos?
Burger King, owned by the British 
company Grand Met, has unveiled 
franchising as its principal strategy 
for taking on the Latin American 
market. At present, the Hom e of 
the W hopper runs about 12 restau­
rants in m etropolitan Mexico City. 
The rest of the region is served 
through a network of independent 
franchises. Business Latin America 
(September 5, 1994) reports the 
standardization of franchising pro­
cedures, including the granting of
I L E
exclusive rights, territorial reserva­
tions, standard royalties and fees, 
and reserving the right to approve 
all new contracts on an individual 
basis. Burger King’s entry into 
Latin America was the focus of a 
case study in the m onthly publica­
tion Finance Director Latin America. 
Copies may be obtained by calling 
1-800-938-4685.
City of Knowledge
The Panamanian governm ent of 
Ernesto Perez Balladares wants to 
put together an ambitious plan to 
exploit the Panama Canal and its 
500-square mile corridor when they 
revert to Panamanian control in 
1999. Foreign Minister Gabriel 
Lewis is reportedly heading a cam­
paign prom oting a Panamanian 
“City of Knowledge” which would 
entail converting the bases into uni­
versities and training centers. Such 
an institution would be modelled 
on the American University in Cairo 
and Beirut, which is accredited by 
professional associations in the US. 
The project requires $50 million in 
seed money and tens of millions in 
m aintenance thereafter.
Law and Order
The October 1994 commando-style 
slaying of Paraguayan anti-drug 
chief Ramon Rosa Rodriguez is far 
from resolved. After denying his 
guilt before the investigating magis­
trate, the main suspect, Captain 
Juan  Emiliano Ruiz Diaz, went on to 
say that Paraguay was hom e to three 
“mini-cartels” headed by prom inent 
politicians and officers of the arm ed 
forces. One of the accused,
Admiral Eduardo Gonzalez Petit,
promised to sue Ruiz Diaz for slan­
der. The allegations sparked a 
national debate over the extent of 
drug trafficking and its influence in 
the country.
Pizza with Champagne
In Buenos Aires, a sociologist’s 
account of Carlos M enem ’s spend­
ing habits sold 10,000 copies in two 
days. According to Silvina W agner’s 
Pizza with Champagne, the lowest- 
income groups in Argentina 
(arguably the segm ent most affected 
by the governm ent’s austerity poli­
cies) still dem onstrate strong elec­
toral support for President Menem 
thanks to his successful bid to end 
hyper-inflation. The author alleges 
that a facade of macroeconomic 
stability obscured growing unem ­
ployment, the deterioration of the 
educational system, worsening 
income distribution, and a spectacu­
lar increase in consumerism.
Wagner claims that her objective in 
writing the book was to profile the 
amorality and impunity of the politi­
cians in late twentieth-century 
Argentina.
Pele Shuffle
Fernando H enrique Cardoso’s pres­
idential appointm ents are getting a 
lot of ink. The appointm ent of for­
m er president Itam ar Franco as 
ambassador to Portugal was over­
shadowed by the nam ing of soccer 
superstar Pele (whose real name is 
Edson Arantes do Nascimento) to 
head the newly created Ministry of 
Sports. Pele’s precedent-setting 
achievements are not limited to ath­
letics: he will be the only black man 
in Cardoso’s cabinet. ■
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Electing Ernesto
Jennifer L. McCoy
W
hen given the 
chance for 
change, Mex­
icans opted for 
the status quo. 
After questions 
over the authenticity of Carlos 
Salinas’s 1988 presidential victory, 
the ruling Partido Revolutionario 
Institutional (Institutional Revolu­
tionary Party, PRI) and opposition 
political parties negotiated a series of 
reforms to open up the electoral 
process. Mexican authorities then 
accredited 88,000 nationals and near­
ly 1,000 foreigners to observe the 
August 21, 1994 elections. With new 
rules and new electoral authorities, 
the groundwork was laid for the 
freest election in Mexican history.
Conventional wisdom and pollsters’ 
predictions indicated that the higher 
the voter turn-out, the better the 
opposition would fare. Instead, with 
voters going to the polls in record- 
breaking numbers, the incumbent 
PRI won both the presidency (with a 
twenty-point margin over the runner- 
up) , and large majorities in both 
houses of Mexico’s Congress.
What did the August 21 vote mean? 
Was it, as the winning party claimed, 
an expression of confidence in the 
government’s performance and its 
promise of a newly democratic sys­
tem? O r was it the product of unfair 
campaign conditions, as the second 
place candidate, Diego Fernandez de 
Cevallos of the Partido Action National
Jennifer McCoy is associate professor of 
political science at Georgia State 
University and senior research associate 
at the Carter Center of Emory University. 
She was an observer to the August 21 
Mexican elections.
(National Action Party, PAN), 
argued? Could it have been the 
result of massive fraud, as charged by 
the third-place candidate, Cuauh­
temoc Cardenas of the Partido de la 
Revolution Democratica (Revolutionary 
Democratic Party, PRD) ?
The same numbers have been used 
to support different interpretations 
of the outcome: those who wish to 
emphasize a mandate for change use 
the percentage of total votes cast (a 
minority of 48.77 percent for the win­
ner, Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI), 
while those who wish to emphasize 
that the PRI still commands a majori­
ty of public support use the percent­
age of valid votes cast (50.18 percent 
for Zedillo), which excludes blank, 
mismarked, and write-in votes.
The vote for the three major par­
ties indicates that the country is 
almost evenly split between a desire 
for continuity and a yearning for 
change in the ruling party: 44 per­
cent of the voters chose the main 
opposition parties, while 48 percent 
chose the incumbent. On the other 
hand, 75 percent chose the two con­
servative parties proposing almost 
identical economic programs—the 
PRI and PAN—over the leftist PRD, 
raising questions about the future for 
a democratic left in Mexico.
The popular congressional ballot­
ing m irrored the presidential vote, 
indicating that, contrary to some 
expectations, voters did not split their 
vote in the presidential and legislative 
elections. However, because of the 
formulas for electing representatives, 
the PRI obtained substantial majori­
ties in both houses: 75 percent of the 
Senate and 60 percent of the 
Chamber of Deputies (the maximum 
allowed by the new election rules). 
Although they are still in the minori­
ty, opposition parties now have more 
congressional representation than at 
any time in the past other than the 
1988-91 session of the Chamber of 
Deputies, when the PRI had only 52 
percent representation.
The size of the PRI victory sur­
prised many analysts, even though 
several public opinion polls prior to 
the elections predicted very similar 
margins. Some pollsters had predict­
ed an outcome similar to Nicaragua’s 
in 1990, where contrary to most polls, 
large blocs of undeclared voters gave 
the victory to the opposition coalition 
over the ruling Sandinistas. Instead, 
Mexico seemed to follow Bulgaria’s 
example, where, in their first compet­
itive elections after the Communist 
collapse, voters kept the (renamed) 
Communist party in power, apparent­
ly out of fear of the unknown.
Ex pl a in in g  t h e  V o te
The debate over the meaning of 
the vote will likely continue to rage in 
Mexico for some time, and cannot be 
definitively answered without in- 
depth public opinion analysis, an 
exhaustive study of electoral com­
plaints, and imprecise socio-psycho- 
logical analysis. We can offer some 
preliminary interpretations, however, 
and assess the claims made by the 
three major presidential candidates.
P er form ance
Government performance during 
Salinas’s sexenio (the six-year term of 
the Mexican executive) very likely 
recovered the middle class vote be­
cause it managed a massive reduction 
in inflation (from 157 percent in 
1988 to less than 7 percent in 1993), 
despite a stagnant economy in the 
last two years of the administration. 
Moreover, although the poor
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remained poor, the Solidarity pro­
gram targeted potential voters in 
poverty-stricken areas, bringing visi­
ble improvements in infrastructure 
and transportation.
On the other hand, the PAN may 
have suffered from negative reactions 
to its own performance in govern­
ment. In each of the three states 
with a PAN governor (Baja California 
Norte, Chihuahua and Guanajuato), 
the PRI swept both the congressional 
and presidential races. Alternatively, 
PAN may have suffered in those states 
because of voter tendency not to split 
the vote between congressional and 
presidential races. This behavior may 
have hurt PAN congressional candi­
dates with those voters who preferred 
the PRI at the executive level but who 
would have supported PAN in the 
Congress.
Cam pa ig n  C o n d it io n s
A lukewarm commitment to elec­
toral reform by the Salinas govern­
ment eventually brought about signif­
icant changes in election rules and 
personnel in 1990, 1993, and 1994. 
However, some of the changes came 
very late in the game, especially the 
change in the governing board of the 
Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal 
Elections Institute, IFE), limiting 
their impact on the 1994 elections.
Attempts to redress very unequal 
campaign conditions were hardly 
effective. Studies of media coverage 
during the campaign showed that the 
two television agencies, Televisa and 
TV Azteca, exhibited considerable 
bias in their news reporting. In June, 
the PRI candidate received three 
times as much coverage as the PRD 
candidate and 4.5 times more cover­
age than the PAN candidate. When 
value judgments about candidates
were injected into stories on Televisa, 
the PRI candidate was disproportion­
ately praised at a rate of twelve to one 
over his competitors. Fairness in 
news coverage improved in July, and 
then deteriorated again in August. 
Access to paid television time for 
opposition parties was severely limit­
ed by its high cost and by network 
resistance to offering prime-time slots 
to opposition candidates.
Attempts to regulate campaign rev­
enues and spending were similarly 
constrained. New policies set cam­
paign spending limits at US$42 mil­
lion per party for presidential cam­
paigns and up to US$9 million for 
Senate races. Only the PRI had the 
resources to spend anywhere near 
these generous limits. New limits on 
individual contributions and require­
ments to make party finances public 
were difficult to enforce.
F r a u d ?
The most promising electoral re­
forms were the new voter registration 
lists and the tamper-proof voter ID 
card, new election-day procedures to 
minimize fraud, increased political 
autonomy of the Electoral Institute’s 
governing board, provisions for Mex­
ican and foreign observers, and a new 
criminal code with a special prosecu­
tor to investigate complaints. Did 
they prevent fraud on election day?
Skepticism about the PRI’s willing­
ness to permit a clean election was 
widespread before the elections. A 
variety of polls conducted in June 
1994 showed that 35-45 percent of 
the electorate expected fraud, while 
between 25 and 50 percent thought 
there would be clean elections 
(Market Opinion and Research 
International/M ORI; La Reforma-, and 
the main electoral watchdog, Alianza
Civica (Civic Alliance)). Even more 
alarming, 65 percent expected vio­
lence in the event of electoral fraud 
(Alianza). Yet, the day after the elec­
tions, when early results showed a 
commanding 20 percent lead for the 
PRI, the streets were quiet, with nei­
ther jubilant victory celebrations nor 
massive protest.
New safeguards and 89,000 ob­
servers contributed to the peace. 
Perhaps most important, parallel vote 
tabulations, or “quick counts” done 
by several independent groups con­
firmed the official results, which oth­
erwise might have been disbelieved. 
Alianza Civica, a Mexican NGO field­
ing 11,000 observers and known to 
include many critics of the PRI, was 
the last to release its quick count, but 
the most im portant in lending credi­
bility to the official results.
Considering the lack of public con­
fidence in the government’s commit­
m ent to transparent elections, and 
the thousands of accredited observ­
ers representing many different orga­
nizations and perspectives, it is not 
surprising that a multitude of views 
regarding electoral conduct surfaced 
after the fact. In addition, many 
observer groups concentrated their 
efforts in limited geographic areas, 
giving rise to different pictures 
depending on the locale.
The Zapatista insurgents charged 
that eight million PRI votes—one- 
quarter of those cast for the ruling 
party—were fraudulent (La Jornada, 
September 4, 1994). On the other 
hand, the US ambassador comment­
ed that the elections represented “a 
major advance for democracy in 
Mexico” (New York Times, August 25, 
1994). My delegation, organized by 
the National Democratic Institute, 
International Republican Institute,
Hemisphere • Volume Six, Number Three 21
Features: M exico
and The Carter Center of Emory 
University, concluded that election- 
day irregularities were not sufficiently 
serious or widespread to have affect­
ed the outcome of the presidential 
race, but that further reforms were 
needed to raise credibility and 
address grossly unequal campaign 
conditions.
The opposition parties held sharply 
differing evaluations of the electoral 
process and its outcome. The PRD 
National Council concluded that “the 
official results cannot be trusted, nor 
are they the result of free and impar­
tial elections. Therefore, these 
results are illegal, and we do not 
know who won or who lost” (La 
Jornada, September 13, 1994). On 
the other hand, the PAN National 
Council accepted the results, arguing 
that, despite the inequities, the offi­
cial results “are the expression of the 
electorate” (ElFinantiero, September 
6, 1994).
The Mexican population’s cynicism 
and lack of trust in the process was 
not entirely assuaged by the out­
come, but greater faith in electoral 
authorities seems to have been 
achieved. A poll published in La 
Reforma and El Norte newspapers in 
the last week of August showed that 
61 percent thought the elections 
were clean, while 24 percent did not 
(15% claimed not to know). Like­
wise, 64 percent thought the IFE 
perform ed very well (The Neivs, 
September 3, 1994).
Nevertheless, a num ber of irregu­
larities were observed that may have 
had an effect on congressional or 
local races, and that continue to raise 
questions about the legitimacy of the 
outcome. Alianza conducted an 
exemplary, systematic analysis of the 
election-day process. In its 
September 19 report, the Alianza 
argued that the irregularities com­
prised a “fraud of components” made 
up of a num ber of discrete practices, 
no single one of which would have 
been sufficient to affect the outcome, 
but the combined impact of which
could have altered congressional and 
local results. The two most serious 
irregularities found in their statistical 
sample of 1,810 voting stations were 
pressure by party representatives to 
influence voters, and violation of the 
secrecy of the vote. Alianza noted 
that these problems were much more 
widespread in the rural and southern 
areas of the country.
One of the most controversial 
aspects of the election was the accura­
cy of the voter registration lists. 
Alianza initially reported that in 70 
percent of the stations, some voters 
with valid identification cards were 
turned away because their names did 
not appear on the lists. This raised 
suspicions that opposition sympathiz­
ers were deliberately “shaved” from 
the lists. The subsequent Alianza 
report, however, found that the num ­
ber of voters potentially affected by 
this problem was not large—an aver­
age of four voters per station, com­
prising less than one percent of the 
registered voters.
Over 1,800 electoral complaints 
were submitted by the political par­
ties to the Electoral Tribunal. The 
PRD filed the most, but PAN cited 
irregularities in almost 15 percent of 
the polling stations, and questioned 
the outcome of five congressional 
races and some local races. In addi­
tion, the election of the governor of 
Chiapas (one of a few state-wide con­
tests coinciding with the national 
elections) was contested by the PRD. 
Subsequently, election authorities 
overturned two congressional seats 
initially won by the PRI, called for 
new elections in two additional con­
gressional races, and overturned the 
PRI victory in the Monterrey mayoral 
race.
V o t e  o f  F ear
A fourth interpretation of the elec­
toral outcome is a socio-psychological 
one: that it was a vote cast out of fear 
of changing ships in a year of trauma. 
The Chiapas rebellion, the assassina­
tion of Luis Donaldo Colosio, and
economic uncertainty in the wake of 
NAFTA and a recession all fed into 
the PRI’s campaign message that it 
was the only party capable of steering 
the country into the future. Was a 
“vote of fear” the result of biased 
media campaigns that distorted per­
ceptions about opposition candi­
dates, or was it a product of an 
ingrained conservative political cul­
ture? Carlos Fuentes writes that 
“Mexico voted for its m other and 
father (the PRI) ” in a “partheno- 
genetic need for parental protec­
tion." The divided vote also reflected 
the country’s division between “its 
conservative, dynastic, patriarchal 
drive and its dwindling patience, its 
mustang instinct, and its political 
ideals” (LaJornada, August 27, 1994).
Assessing the “fear of change fac­
tor” with any precision is practically 
impossible. It is particularly difficult 
to distinguish between the negative 
aspects of the electoral process, 
which can be changed in the future, 
and factors outside the control of the 
parties or government—the contex­
tual factors of the campaign or cul­
tural factors. Nevertheless, post-elec­
tion public opinion surveys should 
allow an initial assessment of how 
these factors affected the Mexican 
vote.
O p p o s it io n  S trateg ic  E r r o r s
A fifth explanation of the vote is 
the campaign strategy followed by the 
opposition parties. A divided opposi­
tion rarely defeats a long-term or 
hegemonic party, unless that party 
itself fragments or decays from with­
in. For instance, the Union National 
Opositora (National Opposition 
Union) coalition in Nicaragua defeat­
ed the Sandinistas only after uniting 
fourteen political parties from the 
left to the right on the political spec­
trum. The Chilean Convergencia 
(Convergence) united the left and 
the center against a divided right to 
defeat Pinochet’s allies in 1989. In 
contrast, Panama’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Party (PRD) won in May
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1994 with only 33 percent of the vote 
against a field of six candidates; and 
in Paraguay, the incumbent Colorado 
party defeated a divided opposition 
with 40 percent of the vote in 1993.
The Mexican opposition utilized 
campaign strategies that at times 
seemed designed to lose rather than 
gain votes. PAN candidate Diego 
Fernandez seemed to drop out of 
sight for a time after a spectacular 
rise in the polls following the May 12 
televised debate. Cardenas eschewed 
media appearances in favor of rallies, 
thus limiting his potential audience. 
The PRD also had difficulty modify­
ing its image as a confrontational and 
even violent party because it persis­
tently predicted fraud without pro­
ducing very convincing evidence, and 
because Cardenas met with Zapatista 
commander Marcos.
M o v e  T oward  D em o cracy?
The 1994 elections were a step 
toward a future of free, competitive 
elections—one element of a democ­
ratic system. The high voter turn-out 
indicated a desire to participate in
electoral politics, and perhaps re­
flected a renewed confidence in elec­
toral institutions. The maturing of 
civil society is another positive result 
of this electoral process. The Mex­
ican civic groups that organized to 
promote democratic reforms and 
observe the elections are unlikely to 
disappear.
But after 65 years of a single ruling 
party and the symbiotic relationship 
this situation has forged between 
party and state, change is not easy 
and much remains to be done. The 
new government has an opportunity 
to promote democratic change and 
enhance its own legitimacy. To do so, 
it will have to avoid the temptation of 
triumphalism—a return to old prac­
tices of unilateral rule—and instead 
reach out to the opposition and 
embrace more political reform. If 
President Zedillo fulfills his promises 
of ending the dedazo (the selection of 
the next president by the incumbent 
one), opening up internal party elec­
tions, and listening to the opposition 
while furthering political reform, 
progress will be more likely.
On the other hand, the weakening 
of the PRD means that a trilateral 
party system representing a range of 
ideological interests is not secure in 
Mexico. The danger is that the 
defeat of the left may engender more 
violent responses. The challenge is 
to revitalize a democratic left that can 
push for social reforms and provide a 
peaceful, political voice for the disad­
vantaged.
A democratic political culture is 
the most difficult element of democ­
racy to achieve, and often the last. 
The tangible elements of political 
rules and institutions are the simplest 
to establish; but until the rules are 
respected, the institutions are trusted, 
and the electoral outcomes are 
accepted by all segments of the soci­
ety, a democratic political culture will 
be elusive and democracy will be in­
complete. In the end, the August 21 
elections may have been the most 
scrutinized and cleanest vote in 
Mexico’s history. But, outside of 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic, 
they were still the most distrusted 
and unfair in the hemisphere. ■
T h e  1994  N atio nal  El ec tio n s  in  M exico
President Senate Chamber of Deputies
(% of votes cast) (# of seats) (# of seats)
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 48.77 95 300
Partido Action National (PAN) 25.94 25 119
Partido de la Revolution Democratica (PRD) 16.60 8 71
Partido del Trabajo (PT) 2.74 - 10
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM) 0.93 - -
Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstruction National (PFCRN) 0.85 - -
Partido Autentico de la Revolution Mexicana (FARM) 0.55 - —
Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) 0.47 - -
Partido Democrata Mexicano (PDM) 0.28 - -
Null votes 2.82 _ _
Other 0.05 - -
TOTAL 100.00% 128 500
Source: Institute Federal Electoral
NOTE: The Chamber of Deputies has 300 seats representing single-member districts, and 200 seats by proportional representation. 
A single party can receive no more than 300 total seats in the Chamber unless it wins 60% of the vote, which raises the maximum 
seats to 315.
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Juan’s Light
Kathleen Logan
S
treet vendor Juan de Dios 
Hoil lives with his wife and 
two daughters in a work­
ing class neighborhood of 
Merida, the historic capital 
city of Yucatan state in 
southern Mexico. Ju an ’s actions 
during recent elections exemplify a 
major trend in Mexican politics— 
the deep grassroots support for 
democratic reform.
After voting in the November
1993 Yucatan state elections, Juan 
re turned  to the polling place with 
his taco cart to sell food to the 
crowd gathered outside. At five in 
the afternoon the voting ended and 
the vote count began. At 6:15 P.M. 
the electricity suddenly went off— 
not only at the poll but all over 
Yucatan. The crowd outside the 
polling station immediately began 
shouting and whistling. No one 
believed that the power outage was 
accidental. Most attributed it to an 
effort by the PRI (Partido 
Revolutionary Institutional) to sabo­
tage the election in order to contin­
ue its 65-year rule.
After a few minutes of darkness, a 
spot of light appeared, moving 
through the crowd. Juan de Dios 
Hoil was bringing the kerosene 
lamp from his cart to the vote coun­
ters inside the poll. As he gave 
them  his lamp, Juan became an 
instant hero to his cheering neigh­
bors. With Ju an ’s light, the vote 
count continued.
Kathleen Logan is an associate professor 
of anthropology at Florida International 
University. Her current research projects 
include studies of women’s participation 
in the democratic transformation of 
Mexico.
C it iz e n  M o b il iz a t io n
Juan de Dios Hoil defended his 
nation’s democratic reform  in a sim­
ple, spontaneous act. In the presi­
dential elections of August 21, 1994 
millions of o ther Mexicans also 
defended democratic reform  by vot­
ing in a record setting turnout— 
nearly 80% of Mexico’s voters went 
to the polls. Their high tu rnou t was 
perhaps the single most im portant 
feature of the 1994 political year 
because it dem onstrated the citizen­
ry’s com m itm ent to political reform.
In the presidential elections 
of August 21, 1994, millions 
of Mexicans defended 
democratic reform by voting 
in a record setting turnout.
For most Mexicans reform ing 
democracy means holding honest 
elections, establishing a multi-party 
system, and ending the PRI’s domi­
nance of their government. For 
others, democratic reform  also in­
cludes economic issues and indige­
nous rights.
Since the first hint of a dem ocrat­
ic opening in the 1960s, Mexicans 
have mobilized politically with a 
depth and sophistication greater 
than at any time in their history. 
Some of their organization has 
taken place within the structure of 
political parties; some in grassroots 
organizations. In either case, 
Mexicans are now positioned to act 
politically as never before.
Millions of Mexicans have jo ined  
the eight political parties that have
em erged from the PRI’s retreating 
shadow. Several of these opposition 
parties have become true political 
forces contesting the PRI’s hegemo­
ny particularly at the regional level. 
The right-of-center PAN (Partido de 
Action National) is strong in Yucatan 
and some western and northern  
states while the left-of-center PRD 
(Partido de la Revolution Democratica) 
draws its support from the Mexico 
City metropolis and various central 
and southern states. The PT (Partido 
de Trabajo), as Mexico’s fourth party, 
shows strength in areas that overlap 
with both PAN and PRD strong­
holds.
In addition to citizen mobilization 
within major opposition political 
parties, Mexicans have also form ed 
smaller, single issue parties such as 
the ecology (Partido Verde Ecologista) 
party. While such parties represent 
only a small minority of voters, they 
do serve to keep compelling issues 
in front of the public eye and 
engage a small sector of dedicated 
activists in the political process.
While the activities of opposition 
parties are widely reported  in the 
media, less well known but equally 
influential are the asociationes civiles 
(civil associations). Since the late 
1960s, Mexicans have organized at 
the grassroots by forming citizen 
watchdog groups, hum an rights 
organizations, campesino collectives, 
urban neighborhood associations, 
and ecology, wom en’s and indige­
nous people’s groups. These civil 
associations have sought political 
reform  and redress of their particu­
lar grievances. Although many such 
groups are organized locally or 
regionally, some are linked together 
nationally and are becoming politi­
cally skilled on the national scene.
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The Frente Civico Familiar, a right of 
center coalition with a pro-business, 
pro-democracy and conservative 
social values agenda, is one such 
organization.
At times, the PRI-dominated 
state’s mishandling of catastrophic 
events has spurred grassroots orga­
nizing. The state’s violent suppres­
sion of the 1968 student movement 
and its inadequate response to the 
devastation of the 1985 Mexico City 
earthquake provoked a serious 
examination of the PRI’s rule by 
many Mexicans. Citizens, especially 
in the Mexico City metropolis, 
responded by forming grassroots 
organizations to bring political 
change. More recently, the rebel­
lion by the Chiapas Maya in January
1994 has led many Mexicans to pon­
der their governm ent’s handling of 
indigenous affairs.
Within both political parties and 
civil associations, space has opened 
for new political actors, most 
notably women. Some observers 
think that the em ergence of women 
in Mexican politics can be partly 
explained by culturally perceived 
ideas of gender. Women politicians 
are often thought to be more 
responsible, honest, and service ori­
ented than men. They are seen as 
m ore likely to represent the peo­
ple’s interest to the state rather than 
the state’s interest to the people. 
Among the most notable women 
leaders who have become im portant 
political figures are Cecilia Soto of 
the PT, Ana Rosa Payan Cervera of 
the PAN, and Rosario Ibarra de 
Piedra, a hum an rights activist.
T hroughout the political cam­
paigns of the 1980s and 1990s, 
opposition political parties and citi­
zen’s grassroots organizations have
galvanized the Mexican populace to 
push for democratic reform. Since 
the PRI, however, still controls the 
pace and direction of reform, politi­
cal parties and citizen groups will 
need to continue their efforts if 
Mexico is to transform its political 
system.
The PRI is not now, nor 
ever has been, a monolith. 
Today, the fissures within 
the PRI are deeper than at 
any time since its founding.
T h e  d in o s a u r s
Equally im portant to citizen mobi­
lization as a transformative force in 
Mexican politics is the PRI itself. In 
August, Mexican voters elected the 
PRI candidate—Dr. Ernesto Zedillo 
Ponce de Leon—as president by a 
narrow margin. While the vote 
count represented a victory for the 
PRI, it was not a mandate.
The PRI’s critics call the party’s 
leaders los dinosaurios in reference 
to the party’s 65-year rule and the 
advanced age of some of its leaders. 
Critics often voice their opposition 
to the PRI as if it were a single, 
cohesive entity.
But the PRI is not now, nor ever 
has been, a monolith. The PRI is a 
political party long divided by ideo­
logical currents, regional differ­
ences, and contesting leaders.
Today, however, the fissures within 
the PRI are deeper than at any time 
since its founding.
At issue within the PRI, as within 
the nation, is the party’s control of
the path and pace of democratic 
reform. Although ideology, region, 
and leadership differences continue 
to be forces that divide the PRI, a 
more basic fissure has developed 
between those who favor reform  
and those who resist it.
Many who resist reform  efforts do 
so to protect their perceived self- 
interest. The PRI has controlled 
the Mexican state and consequently 
all its resources for more than six 
decades, successfully employing a 
patron-client model to garner sup­
port. As a result, many of those affil­
iated with the PRI receive state sub­
sidies or are state employees. PRI 
supporters fear losing their benefits 
or jobs if an opposition party were 
to win control of the state.
O ther PRI members resist reform  
out of party loyalty. They believe 
that the PRI has done m uch good 
for Mexico, can continue to do so, 
and should remain in office. PRI 
loyalists point out that their party is 
the only one with governing experi­
ence and question the ability of any 
opposition party to govern Mexico. 
Those within the PRI who resist 
change also predict that violence 
will accompany political changes 
that displace the PRI. The underly­
ing them e of these arguments is 
that what is good for the PRI is also 
good for Mexico.
O ther factions within the PRI seek 
reform. Such reform ers regard 
political change as inevitable and 
probably beneficial for Mexico in 
the long run. They have the diffi­
cult task of fighting for reform  with 
those that resist it while simultane­
ously presenting a united PRI front 
to the public.
PRI reform ers have sought to con­
trol the process of political change
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through particular strategies. They 
have been gradually willing to con­
cede especially contested areas to 
their political opposition (such as 
local and state elections in the PAN 
and PRD strongholds). PRI reform ­
ers have also opened less powerful 
sectors of the state to the opposition 
(the federal legislature). And they 
have sought to make elections more 
honest or at least sought less obvi­
ous ways to m anipulate the electoral 
process.
PRI infighting will continue 
through the six-year presidency of 
Dr. Zedillo. The most ominous sign 
of this internal party debate, howev­
er, is its violent expression. In 
March 1994 the original PRI presi­
dential candidate, Luis Donaldo 
Colosio, was assassinated. Since 
then the second highest ranking 
PRI official after the president, 
Secretary General Jose Francisco 
Ruiz Massieu, has also been assassi­
nated. Rumors of threats on the 
lives of o ther reform ers including 
President Zedillo continue to circu­
late. Many Mexicans think that the 
assassinations were underw ritten by 
PRI factions that strongly oppose 
change. Others claim that the nar- 
cotraficantes have also been involved, 
using the chaos of violence to go 
after their enemies. Regardless of 
the origins of this violence, however, 
it is the most destructive force in 
the struggle for democracy in 
Mexico.
M e x ic o ’s P o l it ic a l  F u t u r e
Citizen mobilization, internal 
debate within the PRI and the polit­
ical dynamic between these two 
forces propel Mexico toward dem o­
cratic reform. W ithin this context of 
political change, the em ergence of a 
multi-party democracy at the local 
level; the separation of the state 
bureaucracy from the PRI, and the 
integration of the Mexican south 
are issues likely to be im portant.
The signs of a multi-party democ­
racy emerging in Mexico are
most obvious at the local and 
regional level. More and more 
municipal and state governments 
consist of elected officials from two 
political parties. Officials of these 
town councils and state congresses 
can rarely afford the luxury of ideo­
logical debate. Instead they must 
confront specific tasks: getting 
streets paved, schools built, and 
local disputes resolved. The success 
of these multi-party governing bod­
ies will depend on how well they can 
accommodate political plurality. 
Since many resources come from 
the PRI controlled central govern­
ment, a test of the PRI’s commit­
m ent to political plurality will be its 
willingness to give state support to 
opposition or multi-party local and 
regional governments.
Equally significant of the PRI’s 
support of democratic reform  will 
be its willingness to separate itself 
from the state bureaucracy. There 
is a need in Mexico to depoliticize 
public service offices—getting a dri­
ver’s license or a pothole filled need 
not be partisan political acts. Since 
so many public service offices are 
appointed, these officials owe their 
employment to the PRI. The offi­
cials’ first loyalty is likely to be to 
the PRI and not to the public they 
purportedly serve. A few appointed 
offices have been removed from the 
political arena by allowing the same 
bureaucrats to continue in office 
from one change in party adminis­
tration to the next. Nonetheless, 
the PRI and the state are still too 
tightly intertwined.
A more difficult issue for the PRI 
to face than political reform of its 
bureaucracy is the problem  of the 
south. Mexico’s future is being 
forecast in its southern states— the 
nation’s poorest and least politically 
and economically integrated region. 
Subject to decades of neglect, the 
rebellion by the Chiapas Maya has 
dramatically brought the region to 
the center of the nation’s attention.
Many Mexicans recognize the 
legitimacy of Mayan dem ands for 
economic and social justice while at 
the same time decrying violence as 
a solution to the region’s problems. 
Because of the Chiapas rebellion, 
Mexico must confront its indige­
nous present in addition to its 
indigenous past. The m anner in 
which the Zedillo administration 
handles the Chiapas issue will have 
long range consequences not only 
for the indigenous peoples of 
Mexico but also for the southern 
tier of the country in which many of 
them  live. Mexico cannot continue 
to pretend that all of Mexico is like 
the north  and center.
With massive citizen mobilization 
generating a force for political 
change from the bottom up and 
internal debate within the PRI creat­
ing a force from the inside out, 
Mexico pushes its democratization 
into the 21st century. ■
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Guns and Roses
Jack Child
T
he profound changes 
in Latin America’s 
domestic and interna­
tional affairs in the 
last decade have 
inevitably affected the 
military establishments and security 
arrangem ents of the area. Although 
the stated basic mission of Latin 
America’s militaries—defense of sov­
ereignty— (and the unstated one of 
self-preservation and protection of 
privileges) has not changed funda­
mentally, the end of the Cold War 
has seriously underm ined the old 
roles related to counterinsurgency, 
hemispheric defense, and geopoliti- 
cally-based national security doc­
trines.
In response to the changing 
world situation, new military roles 
have been suggested for Latin 
America’s military forces, and in 
many cases assumed. Among the 
missions gaining in importance are 
those linked to the emerging con­
cept of “cooperative security” which 
stresses preventative actions to avoid 
conflicts, and multilateral responses 
to those conflicts that do break out. 
Cooperative security gives the mili­
tary responsibility for confidence- 
building measures (CBMs) designed 
to make conflict less likely. Another 
strong contender as a leading role 
—international peacekeeping— 
attempts to limit outbreaks of con-
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flict and create space for diplomacy. 
While the renewed interest in the 
peacekeeping role has implications 
for the military’s mission—bearing 
on its professionalism, deployment, 
and relationship to the civilian polit­
i al authority—it is not a new role 
for the Latin American military. 
Modest num bers of Latin American 
military observers have form ed part 
of many United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping and peace-observing 
missions from their first deploy­
ments in the late 1940s. On a few 
occasions, nations such as Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru and Panama (and 
later Argentina, Venezuela and 
Uruguay) have provided 500-700 
man battalions in support of UN 
peacekeeping efforts.
The peacekeeping 
role is not a new 
one for the Latin 
American military. 
On a few occasions 
several Latin American 
nations have provided 
500-700 man battalions 
in support of UN 
peacekeeping efforts.
Latin American participation in 
peace-observing activities has hardly 
been restricted to UN operations. 
Within the Organization of 
American States (OAS) there have 
been num erous small civilian-mili­
tary peace-observing efforts m ount­
ed in response to border tensions
and other strains. Unfortunately, 
the OAS’s only attem pt to create an 
Inter-American Peace Force (in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965) result­
ed only in profound distrust of such 
an international force, mainly be­
cause it was evident that the IAPF 
was largely a US operation which 
employed the multilateral organ as a 
cover for unilateral political objec­
tives.
C h a n g in g  N a t u r e  o f  P ea cek eeping
What is new today is the dramatic 
expansion of United Nations peace­
keeping activities, and the growing 
participation of certain Latin 
American military establishments 
(most notably Argentina’s) in these 
UN efforts. In a period when civilian 
leaders are searching for ways to 
redefine the military’s mission, these 
UN peacekeeping roles are some­
times seen as promising ways to give 
the military a real role. Civilian gov­
ernm ents also hope participation 
will direct military attention away 
from internal political issues, and 
perhaps reduce the military estab­
lishment’s size and cost. In some 
cases international peacekeeping is 
also perceived as a way of regaining 
a positive image and prestige lost 
during periods of repression of 
hum an rights. Finally, participation 
in UN peacekeeping can also be a 
useful bargaining chip in the world 
arena. In the Argentine case, partic­
ipation in UN peacekeeping and 
other multilateral operations such as 
the Gulf War and the Haiti embar­
go, has served to strengthen its 
unusually close current relationship 
with the United States.
In retrospect, the Central 
American peacekeeping experience 
from the late 1980s to date was a key
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turning point. The United N ation’s 
two operations (ONUCA in Central 
America—specifically Nicaragua— 
and ONUSAL in El Salvador) repre­
sent the first time the world body 
has m ounted a peacekeeping opera­
tion in the Western Hemisphere. 
There was a substantial contribution 
of troops made by Venezuela (a 
700-plus paratrooper battalion 
employed to convince the “contras” 
to disarm), and a no less notable 
naval contribution by Argentina, 
which deployed patrol boats to the 
Gulf of Fonseca. United Nations 
military observers were also provid­
ed by Argentina, as well as Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia, 
and, in the case of ONUSAL, Chile 
and Mexico provided police instruc­
tors. These Latin American military 
and police officers, wearing the blue 
berets and insignia of the UN, 
worked side by side with two new 
players in Western Hemispheric 
security matters, Canada and Spain. 
The presence of both of these coun­
tries was significant: Canada because 
of its previously low profile in hemi­
spheric affairs (contrasting with its 
long experience in UN peacekeep­
ing) , and Spain because of the rele­
vant example of that nation’s mili­
tary in the transition from a long 
dictatorship to a viable democracy.
In ONUCA/ONUSAL Latin 
American officers were extensively 
exposed to the culture of UN peace­
keeping, including the minutiae of 
operational problems stemming 
from different languages, logistical 
systems, and political backgrounds. 
Their involvement, however, was not 
unanimously welcomed. A num ber 
of Latin American military officers 
serving in ONUCA/ONUSAL had 
what was euphemistically called
Latin American Military Expenditures
Francisco Rojas Aravena
• The end of the Cold War has not led to significant changes in Latin 
American military spending. Despite the peace process in El Salvador 
and elsewhere, the inertia of the Cold War continues in Central 
America. In South America, the end of the Cold War did not alter per­
ceptions of threat and notions of national defense in any significant 
manner. A key determinant of defense spending in South America is 
the prevalence of border issues.
• Regional military spending is primarily determined by the past; that is, 
the reiterative process of resource allocation (criimo histmico de asig- 
naciori). The “personal” line item is the most important factor. 
Research has demonstrated that the armed forces are able to lobby on 
behalf of their own bureaucracies and budgets on a yearly basis. Only a 
profound financial restriction has a meaningful impact on military 
spending. International agreements appear to be one alternative which 
will allow the consolidation of stability while reaping the dividends of 
peace.
• Even considering individual variation among cases, military spending 
in Latin America is affected by the domestic political conditions in each 
country. Politically stable countries (such as Argentina and Chile) must 
be contrasted with those facing problems of governability (Brazil, 
Venezuela, and the nations of Central America) or open conflicts with 
either drug traffickers or insurgent forces (Colombia and Peru). These 
domestic political conditions affect the annual process of lobbying for 
budget allotments.
• A major factor affecting the stability of spending patterns during the 
post Cold War period is the lack of a common threat. The absence of 
an extra-continental enemy has contributed to the inability of the 
region to define global security policies. This trend, however, has not 
prevented the acquisition of the new generation of weapons so promi­
nently showcased by the LIS during the Persian Gulf War.
• The general trend in Latin America has been toward a slight reduction 
in military spending. There is evidence of a small decrease in Central 
America; in South America, military spending remained constant at 
approximately two percent of GDP. In the latter case, the last half of the
continued on page 31
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“unhelpful hum an rights back­
grounds” earned while engaged in 
counterinsurgency operations in 
their own countries. There were 
charges that these same individuals 
had a tendency in some cases to side 
with the Nicaraguan contras and the 
Salvadoran security forces. There 
were also criticisms of the propriety 
of Argentine military officers pro­
tecting the hum an rights of Central 
Americans, and of Mexican police 
officials teaching professional 
integrity to the newly-formed 
Salvadoran police forces.
T h e  A r g e n t in e  C ase
There have been remarkable 
changes in both the Argentine mili­
tary and that country’s international 
relations in the past decade. The 
starting point for this shift can be 
traced back to the searing experi­
ence of a long and harsh military 
dictatorship and Argentina’s decisive 
defeat in 1982 at the hands of Great 
Britain. The process of change 
began under the Alfonsin adminis­
tration, and accelerated under the 
presidency of Carlos Menem.
As a result, Argentina is now the 
most active Latin American support­
er of UN peacekeeping missions, 
and also an enthusiastic proponent 
of CBMs to reduce tensions in the 
Southern Cone. There is some 
opposition to these new roles, but in 
general they seem to be well accept­
ed by both military and civilian sec­
tors. It would be simplistic to con­
clude that this means that the 
Argentine military has permanently 
renounced intervention in politics, 
but it has resulted in the formal 
acceptance of international peace­
keeping as an Army role, albeit a 
secondary one. There are also 
intriguing suggestions that the 
Argentine "test case” may be trans­
ferable to other Latin American mil­
itary institutions, possibly through 
the establishment of a regional 
peacekeeping training center in 
Argentina. An alternate proposal
would give the Inter-American 
Defense Board a role in planning, 
analyzing and publicizing Latin 
American involvement in UN peace­
keeping missions and using the 
Inter-American Defense College as 
the vehicle for transmitting this 
knowledge to individuals (civilian as 
well as military) who might be 
involved in future such missions.
Quotes a captain: “I  was 
trained to kill. This business 
about soldiers deployed for 
the purpose of avoiding 
war seems foreign to 
everything I  knew... ”
Argentina’s support for the 
UNPROFOR peacekeeping force in 
Croatia represents a major contribu­
tion. The battalion, transported by 
the Argentine Air Force, went with 
its own organic vehicles and commu­
nications equipment. It was not a 
typical Argentine Army infantry bat­
talion: it was heavily officered, and 
deliberately so in order to help 
insure a high level of professional­
ism, as well as to rotate the majority 
of the jun io r officers in the 
Argentine Army through a UN 
peacekeeping experience via 
6-month reliefs of personnel. 
According to Army Chief of Staff 
General Martin Balza, in June 1993 
its composition was 14 field grade 
officers, 113 jun io r officers, and 757 
NCOs. Overall Argentine participa­
tion in UN peacekeeping, he added, 
has grown from an average of 20 sol­
diers in the 1983-89 period to 100 in
1991 and 3850 in 1993.
One measure of Argentina’s expe­
rience in Croatia can be seen in 
newspaper coverage of President 
M enem ’s trip to inspect the 
Argentine battalion (accompanied
by General Balza) in mid-1992. 
Selected quotes from a 2 August
1992 Clarin article illustrate the 
impact of the mission: “the experi­
ence is absolutely atypical for 
Argentine Army personnel...As well 
as being an investigation into past 
and present military conduct, the 
report is also a reflection on the 
tools that will be used to build a new 
Army...Quotes a captain: “I was 
trained to kill. This business about 
soldiers deployed for the purpose of 
avoiding war seems foreign to every­
thing I knew”...the Argentine Blue 
Helmets are involved in an experi­
m ent destined to have a consider­
able impact on their military culture 
and change their outlook...they are 
also learning terms such as “minori­
ty rights,” now incorporated into 
their professional language as keys 
to the success of their missions.”
P r o p o n e n t s  a n d  O p p o n e n t s
Proponents of peacekeeping roles 
for the Latin American military 
include those who stress support for 
the world body, as well as altruistic 
contributions to the achievement of 
peace. It is also true that individual 
soldiers usually profit financially 
from UN service, as do many of 
their governments, depending on 
the arrangements made with UN 
Headquarters. The military institu­
tions also benefit professionally from 
the training and experience they 
derive from such service. From a 
national perspective, service in UN 
peacekeeping missions tends to ele­
vate the profile and prestige of the 
country. Finally, for a military insti­
tution like Argentina’s, still laden 
with the baggage of years of military 
dictatorship, the “Dirty War,” and 
the fiasco of the Falklands/Malvinas 
defeat, involvement in UN peace­
keeping offers the opportunity to 
recover some of the prestige and 
self-respect lost in that period. The 
fact that almost 25% of the officers 
and non-commissioned officers of 
the Argentine Army now have
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international peacekeeping experi­
ence has profound significance for 
the institution.
Service in UN peacekeeping mis­
sions also reinforces the ties of mili­
tary transnationalism by building on 
the camaraderie of shared experi­
ences with soldiers of many nations. 
As an example, General Balza 
remarked that he had been deeply 
moved by a handwritten condolence 
note sent to him after two Argentine 
soldiers were killed while on UN 
duty in Croatia. The note came 
from retired British General Jeremy 
Moore—the man who had led the 
British forces in the Falklands/ 
Malvinas campaign in which General 
Balza had been an artillery comman­
der.
The new concepts and approaches 
concerning peacekeeping have not 
received unanimous approval from 
the Latin American military. In 
Central America, the right wing in 
general, especially in El Salvador, 
reacted violently to the notion of 
United Nations involvement in what 
they perceived as their sovereign 
internal affairs. A typical extreme 
view was that UN intervention in the 
context of peacekeeping and hum an 
rights observation was a neo-Marxist 
plot. According to this view, UN 
activities in this field would weaken 
the state and leave it ripe for a 
takeover by leftist elements within 
their nation. Those holding this 
view would also argue that the 
demise of the Soviet Union did not 
m ean the disappearance of Marxist 
insurgents in their country.
Others see international peace­
keeping missions as an “internation­
alizing” or “denaturing” of the most 
basic national institution: the mili­
tary. By involvement in these out­
side missions, they argue, the mili­
tary is diverted from its fundamental 
mission of defense of national sover­
eignty and weakens its roots in the 
national body politic to the point 
that the nation itself is endangered. 
Opposition to confidence-building
continued from page 29
1980s witnessed an appreciable decline in military spending relative to 
central government expenditures (from 6.8% in 1986 to 5.3% in 1991).
• Legislatures throughout Latin America have been notably absent from 
the decision making process with respect to military spending. National 
budgets are generally decided by the executive branch behind closed 
doors with little or no public or legislative scrutiny. It should come as 
no surprise that military spending would fit the same pattern. This, of 
course, is not surprising as closed decision making styles are also evident 
in the making of economic policy.
• Military spending in Latin America in the wake of the Cold War peri­
od has not been based on sound defense policies. Given the lack of clear 
objectives and goals, it is difficult to measure the efficiency of military 
spending. Moreover, all debate regarding military spending in Latin 
America tends to be ideological and elitist. This makes the formulation 
of sound defense policies more difficult. Broader debate on defense 
matters would increase the transparency and accountability of military 
spending patterns and generate policy options that could be supported 
by other socio-political actors. ■
M ili t a r y  S p en d in g  in  S o u t h  A m erica  (as a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  GDP)
1981 1985 1989 1990 1991
Argentina 3.8 3.8 3.5 2.6 1.9
Bolivia 3.3 NA 3.6 3.5 2.4
Brazil 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.7 1.3
Chile 3.8 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.4
Colombia 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.6
Ecuador 3.4 2.8 1.8 2.1 2.1
Guyana 4.4 8.5 1.9 1.3 1.0
Paraguay 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.7
Peru 4.2 6.5 NA 1.8 1.1
Surinam NA 2.7 2.6 4.0 3.8
Uruguay 4.0 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.1
Venezuela 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.0 3.6
South America 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1994. NA: not available.
Material from this inset originally appeared in Gasto Militar en America 
Latina: Procesos de Decisiones y Adores Claves (Santiago: Cinde/FIACSO, 
1994). The author, Francisco Rojas Aravena, is coordinator of die 
Department of International and Military Relations at the Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago, Chile.
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measures has centered on a similar 
view which holds that CBMs are 
nothing more than a thinly-dis- 
guised civilian plot to use dimin­
ished threats as an excuse to dramat­
ically cut back the military.
Finally, the fact that many of the 
ideas regarding CBMs and peace­
keeping seem to come from the 
“gringos to the n o rth ” (and more 
recently the “gringos from the far 
no rth ,” i.e., Canada) stirs up resent­
ment. O pponents recall the years 
when US academics and policymak­
ers proposed num erous new mis­
sions and fanciful schemes to change 
the roles of the Latin American mili­
tary in ways that seemed to serve US 
policy interests more than the needs 
of Latin Americans themselves.
P r o s p e c t s
Despite objections to peacekeep­
ing roles, confidence-building mea­
sures and cooperative security, it 
seems clear that many of the Latin 
American military establishments 
will be considering and implement­
ing these concepts in the years 
ahead. For the generally small mili­
tary establishments of Central 
America the most significant influ­
ence will be the impact that peace­
keeping and CBMs had (and will 
continue to have) in the Central 
American peace process. Because of 
their size and limited capabilities it 
is unlikely that these militaries will 
be asked to participate significantly 
in UN peacekeeping operations.
For the larger military establish­
ments of South America, UN peace­
keeping represents a significant, 
although secondary role for them  to 
play on the world scene. The 
Argentine example is illustrative 
here in the way its strong participa­
tion in UN peacekeeping in the last 
few years has been an im portant 
instrum ent of Argentina’s foreign 
policy as well as potentially rehabili­
tating a military which lost prestige 
and morale during a dark period 
of its history. Argentina’s involve­
m ent in UN peacekeeping, and its 
historically unprecedented collabo­
ration with the United States, are 
being watched carefully by the other 
military establishments of the hemi­
sphere.
The impact of these new roles on 
civil-military relations and the 
process of democratization is a deli­
cate one. Attempts to link these 
roles too closely to reductions in mil­
itary budgets and influence are like­
ly to backfire. And yet, there is the 
obvious implication that CBMs and 
cooperative security can make 
inter-state conflict in Latin America 
less likely, and thus perm it a more 
realistic assessment of genuine mili­
tary needs, as well as permitting a 
certain am ount of military resources 
to be made available to the UN for 
peacekeeping missions.
The present mom ent is also one 
of reassessment of roles for the mul­
tilateral institutions of hemispheric 
security, especially the Inter- 
American Defense Board and 
College. Their continued existence 
is being seriously questioned, and 
their survival may well rest on their
ability to focus on international 
peacekeeping, CBMs, and coopera­
tive security as their primary area of 
interest.
The role of the United States in 
this process must be a careful one. 
An over-eager attem pt to push these 
new roles on the Latin American 
military is likely to be counter-pro- 
ductive. It would be far wiser to 
allow the Latin American militaries, 
working closely with their civilian 
political leadership, to determ ine 
the pace and direction of these new 
approaches. Fortunately, there are 
o ther nations with more experience 
than the LTnited States in these fields 
which have indicated an interest in 
working with Latin American mili­
taries. Canada and Spain are in the 
forefront here, and their consider­
able involvement in the Central 
American peace process (as well as 
in UN missions elsewhere) should 
be used as a vehicle for showing the 
advantages of greater participation 
in UN peacekeeping, confidence- 
building measures, and cooperative 
security arrangements with all the 
nations of the hemisphere. ■
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Forgotten Minority
M artin Edwin Andersen
I
n the wake of the 1994 revolt 
in Chiapas, Mexico, 
Argentine President Carlos 
S. Menem suddenly put his 
country’s security services on 
heightened alert. Although 
a continent away from the Mexican 
strife, Menem warned that a 
“Chiapas-style” rebellion was possible 
against the government in Buenos 
Aires. Even M enem’s supporters 
scoffed at the idea as preposterous— 
Argentine ambassador to 
Washington Raul Granillo Ocampo 
later flatly denied any similarity 
between events in Mexico and those 
in his country. Yet, however alarmist 
or politically calculating, Menem 
raised a specter ignored by many 
ensconced in the European comforts 
of Buenos Aires—from La Quiaca in 
the north to the Straits of Magellan 
in the south, Argentine Indians still 
struggle for survival.
As late as 1993, official Argentina 
pointedly ignored the country’s esti­
mated 100,000 to one million Native 
Americans. Neither census data nor 
annual government statistics counted 
Indians as a distinct category. This 
disregard was not limited to the 
bureaucrats in the Rio de la Plata: 
Edgar Krebs, an Argentine academic 
teaching at Wolfson College, Oxford, 
said he was startled to find that 
World Bank documents were written 
as if there were no Indians in 
Argentina.
Martin Edwin Andersen is the author 
of Dossier Secreto: Argentina’s 
Desaparecidos and the Myth of the 
“Dirty War” (Boulder: Westview, 1993) 
He is a senior consultant at the Center 
for Democracy in Washington, DC.
The lack of precise government 
information helps to account for the 
wildly disparate estimates on Indian 
populations. According to some cal­
culations, 300,000 Native Americans 
live in their own communities, while 
as many as 1.5 million have emigrat­
ed to urban areas. The National 
Aboriginal Pastoral Team (Equipo 
National Pastoral Aborigen) has put 
the total num ber at 447,000 people 
clustered in 13 ethnic groups. Of 
these, 170,000 are Kolias, 90,000 
Mapuches, 80,000 Wichis, and
60,000 Tobas. O ther groups include 
the Chiriguanos, Pilagas, Matacos, 
Teheulches, and the mixed-race 
Ona-Criollos and Yamana-Criollos.
“The struggle today is for 
our own territory. Not just 
a property title that 
assures our right to a 
piece of land...
Although Indian communities dot 
the length of the country, the prob­
lems they face unite them: lack of 
their own land; illiteracy; unemploy­
m ent and exploitation in the work­
place; and a host of physical mal­
adies ranging from childhood mal­
nutrition to tuberculosis, cholera, 
alcoholism, and venereal disease. In 
some communities, infant mortality 
is estimated to be as high as 40 per­
cent. Argentina’s indigenous peo­
ples are also increasingly united in 
dem anding that the government 
provide answers to their demands 
for fair and equitable treatment. 
Argentine society, however, has been 
slow to recognize the dramatic con­
ditions facing their Native American 
compatriots. According to anthro­
pologist Carlos Martinez Sarasola, 
author of the critically acclaimed 
book Nuestros paisanos los indios, the 
attitude of the Menem government 
is even worse. “A few of its most 
recent statements,” he told the 
Buenos Aires daily La Nation shortly 
after the Chiapas uprising, “show 
more than a hint of a recurring seg­
regationist attitude.”
The first Native American settlers 
came to the territory that is now 
Argentina some 12,000 years ago. By 
the time the first Spanish conquerors 
arrived, there were between 500,000 
and one million Native Americans 
divided into 23 distinct ethnic 
groups. The encomienda system insti­
tuted by the Spanish crown gave 
colonists power over local tribes and 
allowed them to collect tribute from 
the Indians. Another colonial insti­
tution, the merced, gave the settlers 
territorial rights; those Indians living 
in these newly-demarcated areas 
were forced to work for the land’s 
new owners. In 1813, an effective­
ly— if not formally— independent 
Argentina abolished the encomienda. 
The mercedes land grants awarded by 
the Spanish crown, however, contin­
ued to be recognized as property 
rights by the new government.
Beginning in the mid-16th century, 
Araucanians from Chile embarked 
on a process of commercial relation­
ships and intermarriages that 
extended their influence from the 
north of Patagonia to a point south 
of the provincial capital of Cordoba. 
With the Araucanians came the 
Mapuche language and customs 
from the other side of the Andes. 
Often this cultural penetration came 
at the expense of Spanish settlers
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pushing inward from the Rio de la 
Plata. Helping to solidify this new 
Indian civilization was the fact that 
by the end of the 17th century, the 
Chilean Araucania was an indepen­
dent territory with formal, and large­
ly cordial, relations with colonial 
administrators. The resulting loyalty 
of the Native American leadership to 
the Spanish crown (also due in part 
to the influence of the royalist-lean­
ing Franciscan O rder), and a series 
of attempts by pro-Independence 
forces to underm ine the tribal chiefs, 
brought the Indians increasingly into 
conflict with the emerging nations of 
Chile and Argentina. As fortunes 
turned against Spain, Native 
Americans and royalist whites left 
Chile for the expanse of Argentina’s 
grasslands and deserts, from whence 
they could regroup and plot.
Around the time of independence, 
an effort was made to integrate the 
Native Americans living in the pam­
pas into Argentina’s European soci­
ety. The attempt foundered, howev­
er, on the Indians’ illiteracy in 
Spanish, and the consequent suspen­
sion of their citizenship. The debate 
in criollo society about the role of 
Indians in the new Argentine nation 
continued to be shrouded in ambi­
guity. Notes Krebs: “The predomi­
nant theme was the impossibility of 
our side understanding what the 
other side is thinking.” Aristotelian 
concepts about “thinking and 
unthinking peoples” were offered 
side-by-side with declarations such as, 
“An Indian is an Indian, and we can­
not force the condition of being an 
Argentine upon them .” Even the 
enlightened constitutionalist Juan 
Bautista Alberdi, pondering the furi­
ous division over how to deal with 
the country’s original inhabitants,
ventured that Argentines should not 
leave “islands of barbarism” within 
their country.
Integrationist hopes, and even the 
divide-and-conquer paternalism of 
dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, were 
followed with periodic extermination 
campaigns, such as one led by 
Colonel Federico Rauch, in which 
the Unitarian government of Buenos 
Aires ordered him to “destroy the 
Chilean Indians.” Native American 
collaborators were not to be given 
any quarter: their women, children, 
cattle, and horses were rem anded to 
the possession of the state. “Animals, 
jewelry and the tribes’ belongings,” it 
was ordered, “will belong to the 
troops and the militias.”
...Our cause has to do with 
our development and a 
strategy for living. ”
—Mapuche leader Jorge Nahuel
In the 1870s and 1880s, while the 
US wound down its own Indian wars, 
Argentina undertook a final cam­
paign to wipe out Native American 
presence in the pampas. General 
Roca’s “Conquest of the Desert” sub­
jugated and occupied northern 
Patagonia, putting the finishing 
touches on the domination of Native 
Americans and reducing the Indians 
to virtual slaves.
The quandary faced by 19th centu­
ry Argentine thinkers, about how to 
deal with “the O ther”—the non-criollo 
compatriot—reem erged with Juan 
Peron’s reign (1946-1955). Although 
his government lacked a specifically
pro-Indian policy, the enactm ent of a 
statute regulating rural labor and the 
incorporation of the working class— 
its ranks swollen by darker-skinned 
immigrants from the interior of the 
country—into Argentina’s political 
and economic life, won Peron a 
degree of sympathy from the 
nation’s Indian communities. (Those 
with long memories, however, 
recalled the events of August 1946: 
Shortly after Peron took power, a 
group of Kolia Indians—given the 
sobriquet of “the Indian raid of 
Peace” (el vialon de la paz)—traveled 
to Buenos Aires from the northwest 
province of Salta. Upon their arrival, 
and after a trip that took almost a 
month, they were beaten by police 
and put on a train back to the salteno 
departm ent of Oran under armed 
guard. Several died.) Because of the 
largely favorable treatment, at the 
end of Peron’s nearly decade-long 
reign, the young novelist Ernesto 
Sabato wrote:
“While we doctors, farm-owners 
and writers were noisily rejoicing in 
the living room over the fall of the 
tyrant, in the corner of the kitchen I 
saw how two young Indian women 
who worked there had their eyes 
drenched with tears. And although 
in all those years I had meditated 
upon the tragic duality that divided 
the Argentine people, at that 
m om ent it appeared to me in its 
most moving form...Many millions 
of dispossessed people and workers 
were shedding tears at that instant, 
for them a hard and sober moment. 
Great multitudes of their humble 
compatriots were symbolized by 
those two Indian girls who wept in 
a kitchen in Salta.”
The division of opinion over what 
to do about the Indians spanned a
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succession of hapless civilian govern­
ments and right wing military 
regimes. In the early 1970s 
Monsignor Enrique Angelelli, the 
bishop of M enem’s own province of 
La Rioja, found himself ministering 
to a region of large landholders and 
Indian peons. Angelelli, who was 
m urdered by the military regime in 
1976, used parables mixed with local 
rites and traditions to convince 
native parishioners to abandon feel­
ings of racial inferiority. Throughout 
Argentina, land reform advocates, 
and even orphanages for Indian chil­
dren, were targets of allegedly inde­
pendent right-wing death squads 
working in collusion with the mili­
tary.
With the return of democracy in 
1983, neglect rather than repression 
characterized the treatment of 
Indians. A 1985 study by the 
Parliamentary Information Office 
(Direction de Information 
Parlamentaria) found that, of the 200 
pages of statutes and regulations con­
cerning Indians, none offered 
indigenous causes much support. It 
was only in 1989, fifteen years after it 
was presented by Radical Party 
Senator Fernando de la Rtia, that 
Parliament passed Law 23302, which 
established a National Institute of 
Indigenous Affairs (Institute National 
de Asuntos Indtgenas, INAT). Indian 
leaders hailed the measure as the 
first legislative effort which utilized 
Native American ideas and lacked a 
heavy overlay of paternalism.
Although their indigenous activism 
pales in comparison to the hundreds 
of thousands of Indians who have 
mobilized to protest in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, or the peasant insurgencies 
of Mexico and Guatemala, 
Argentina’s Native Americans have 
won increasing attention to their 
struggle. In 1992, some 200 repre­
sentatives of the Mapuche in 
Argentina and Chile met in the cen­
tral Argentine city of Neuquen to dis­
cuss how to create a new nation and 
recover part of their ancestral territo­
ries. (As a tribal group, the estimat­
ed 50-90,000 Mapuches have been 
one of the most resistant to attempts 
to destroy their culture. They have 
made a strong effort to hold onto 
their traditions and original lan­
guage as a cornerstone of their own 
identity.) In 1993, Kolia Indians 
from Oran in Salta province went to 
Buenos Aires to dem and the return 
of lands stolen from their ancestors 
three centuries ago. For three weeks 
they camped in front of the Con­
gress building while carrying out a 
hunger strike. Last August, fourteen 
Indian groups descended on the 
provincial capital of Santa Fe to 
make their views known to the 
Constituent Assembly considering 
reforms to the Argentine 
Constitution. For the first time, 
Indian rights were enshrined in the 
country’s magna carta under a modi­
fication of Article 67. Approved by 
acclamation, it declared that 
Argentina:
“Recognizes the ethnic and cultur­
al preexistence of Argentina’s indige­
nous peoples; guarantees respect for 
their identity and the right to bilin­
gual and multi-cultural education; 
recognizes the legal existence of 
their communities, and the posses­
sion and title of the lands they tradi­
tionally occupy, and regulates the 
handing out of others suitable and 
sufficient for hum an development, 
none of which will be alienable, 
transferrable nor subject to taxes or 
embargoes; and assures their partic­
ipation efforts concerning natural 
resources and other interests that 
affect them. The provinces can also 
concurrently exercise these attri­
butes.”
In referring to the “handing ou t” 
of other lands, the word “guarantee” 
was originally used in place of “regu­
late,” but the initial draft was watered 
down at the insistence of M enem’s 
Peronists. They claimed that by 
"guaranteeing” land, the Assembly 
was risking multi-million dollar law­
suits by Indians against the state. Oil
companies were also reportedly con­
cerned about what the language 
m eant to their interests, particularly 
regarding subsoil rights. “Everyone 
will be grappling for a basis for argu­
m ent,” said Krebs, “and it will likely 
be quite messy.”
Continued gains by Argentina’s 
Indians, however, may be threatened 
by the Menem government’s seem­
ing willingness to make them scape­
goats or bogeymen. It was revealed 
in late 1994 that, shortly after the 
Chiapas uprising, Argentine military 
and intelligence services were train­
ing Mexican army and police offi­
cials in counterinsurgency tactics, 
both in Buenos Aires and in the field 
in Chiapas. In both countries— 
where memories of the misnamed 
“dirty war” carried out in the mid- 
1970s to early 1980s by the Argentine 
military still cut deeply— the move 
was widely condemned. Similar ques­
tions arose about whether the 
Argentine military was engaged in a 
reprise in Mexico of activities—the 
promotion of death squads and bru­
tal interrogation techniques—it used 
in Central and South America dur­
ing the period of the “dirty war.” 
Following revelations in the 
Mexican and Argentine press, 
Menem denied that active-duty 
Argentine officers were engaged in 
Chiapas. Still, sources in Buenos 
Aires familiar with military intelli­
gence say the use of retirees as 
plausibly-deniable “cut-outs” has 
been a common practice. In 
November, Menem appeared to 
endorse the same repressive 
methodology that earned several 
form er military commanders prison 
sentences for crimes against hum an­
ity. “It was thanks to the presence 
of the arm ed forces,” Menem said, 
“that we fought and trium phed in 
that dirty war which took our com­
munity to the brink of collapse.”
The implications of that message 
could not be clearer in Mexico 
and in Indian communities in 
Argentina. I
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Nursing Home (Asilo de Ancianos), Havana, 1994
Manuel Ruiz-Barrera is a student of fine arts and history at Florida International University. He travels and photographs extensively in Cuba. 
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The Viking of El Salvador
Tricia Juhn
Rebel Radio: The Story o f El 
Salvador’s Radio Venceremos
By Jose Ignacio Lopez Vigil 
Translated by Mark Fried 
Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1994. 
288 pp.
T
he journalist Jose 
Ignacio Lopez Vigil 
has compiled this oral 
history of Radio 
Venceremos (“We shall 
trium ph”) , the clan­
destine radio station of the Frente 
Farabundo Marti para la Liberation 
National (FMLN)—a coalition of 
insurgents who made war on the 
Salvadoran government from 1981- 
1992. Revolving around a cast of a 
dozen or so principals, the story 
begins with Comandante Jonas show­
ing up at the first speaker’s home in 
Mexico to work out the technicalities 
of an underground guerrilla radio 
broadcast. Jonas wants an AM sta­
tion that can be heard in the capital 
city. The first broadcasts began in 
1979, courtesy of an antique sixty- 
pound transmitter, the “Valiant 
Viking,” taken from a fishing boat.
During the war, Radio Venceremos's 
main accomplishment was to keep 
broadcasting, despite the Salvadoran 
army’s attempts to find the transmit­
ter and shut it down. Venceremos’s 
team was practically a mobile army 
unit, and, brags one storyteller, it 
could bug out of a locale in fourteen 
minutes. From bat caves and trench-
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es, it broadcast an endless stream of 
lethally dull editorials, live front-line 
news, and re-enacted battle reports.
Rebel Radio has a great deal of 
hum or in it, particularly when it 
chronicles the frenetic couplings of 
Venceremos’s staff (the ratio of men to 
women was seven to one) and the 
courting of the raven-haired beauty, 
compa Marcela. Competition for her 
tender mercies drives two of the men 
to ‘joust like errant knights,” and 
produces such delightful outbursts as 
“oh mama, so many curves and me 
without brakes!” (it does lose some­
thing in the translation, otherwise 
smoothly executed by Mark Fried). 
Venceremos’s broadcasts also featured 
a num ber of serials spoofing the real- 
life panoram a’s major players. US 
embassy staff tuned in on a regular 
basis to hear what was happening to 
“a gringo marrying a Salvadoran 
woman” (as US Ambassador Deane 
Hinton eventually d id); or to hear 
Venceremos’& impression of General 
Eugenio Vides Casanova—former 
Minister of Defense—reciting a 
Shakespearean sonnet.
Even the most elastic definition of 
broadcast journalism would not 
encompass Venceremos’s unverified 
rebel assertions, but sometimes it was 
the best available facsimile. By the 
early 1980s, the army and the death 
squads had effectively shut down the 
independent and opposition media 
in El Salvador; Venceremos turned out 
to be telling the truth about things 
the government placidly denied.
Most notable in this category was the 
1981 massacre at El Mozote, where 
the army killed thousands of peas­
ants in a single counterinsurgency 
campaign. Venceremos broadcast news 
of El Mozote immediately, while the 
US and Salvadoran governments
denied it for more than a decade. 
Only with the release of the United 
Nations-sponsored Report of the 
Truth Commission (1993) and Mark 
Danner’s flawless profile in the New 
Yorker (December 6, 1993), was the 
truth of El Mozote disinterred.
The campaign to shut down 
Venceremos led to the 1984 death of 
lieu ten an t Colonel Domingo 
Monterrosa, whom the FMLN 
dubbed the “butcher of El Mozote.” 
M onterrosa’s m en seized a “Trojan” 
version of the Viking, which had 
been wired with explosives. When 
the helicopter containing 
Monterrosa and the transmitter lift­
ed off to head for a press confer­
ence, a remote switch ignited eight 
sticks of dynamite.
The folksy, front-porch delivery of 
these anecdotes should not, however, 
obscure the distinctly bellicose raison 
d ’etre of Venceremos. Ideology is only a 
small part of this volume; which is 
another way of saying that the rav­
ages of that war are presented in a 
light-hearted, innocent fashion, as if 
the FMLN were not also engaged in 
generating its fair share of slaugh­
tered innocents, betrayals, and abort­
ed peace negotiations. While its 
deviations from the conventions of 
war cannot measure up to those of 
its opponents, neither should one 
accept this volume’s romantic remi­
niscences of life during wartime.
Three things contributed to the 
spectacular success of the FMLN:
The first was the intractability of the 
ruling regimes in El Salvador; the 
second was the sheer military tenaci­
ty of the FMLN; and the third was its 
propaganda machine, a constant 
thorn in the side of the counterinsur­
gents. So impressive was this last ele­
m ent that in 1983, with the Reagan
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administration growing increasingly 
vitriolic about the communist men­
ace in El Salvador, France and 
Mexico recognized the FMLN as a 
“legitimate political force, with all 
the rights and responsibilities 
derived therefrom .” The FMLN 
established networks of sympathizers 
in the US and Europe, where ordi­
nary citizens gave cash to its cause, 
entreated their elected representa­
tives in one direction or another, and 
helped bring the Salvadoran war into 
the legislative chambers of foreign 
governments.
By 1987, the government of 
Napoleon Duarte (1984-1989) was 
forced to counteract its plummeting 
international legitimacy by devoting 
scarce resources to a kind of counter­
propaganda network in Europe (in 
the US, it made do with a high-pro­
file ambassador, Ernesto Rivas 
Gallont). Likewise, a major turning 
point on the road to peace came 
during the presidency of Alfredo 
Cristiani (1989-1994), who early on 
directed his European diplomatic 
staff to cease and desist all anti- 
FMLN propaganda as a demonstra­
tion of his commitment to negotia­
tions without quarter.
The job of propaganda, like social 
science, is to insist upon a certain 
version of history. In the final analy­
sis, Rebel Radio is more propaganda, 
told in a jocular fashion, both self- 
promoting and self-effacing. With 
the war over, the stakes of Vence­
remos'% broadcasts are not quite as 
lethal as they once were: The mo­
m entum  toward national reconcilia­
tion moves even form er combatants 
to face the future with a selective 
memory. Venceremos is now a legiti­
mate business operation, playing top 
40 in the capital city. ■
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Elections in Latin America
M arian Goslinga
etween November
1993 and the end of 
1994, eleven countries 
in Latin America 
scheduled elections 
with centrist candi­
dates claiming victory in the majori­
ty of cases. The attached bibliogra­
phy shows that electoral democracy 
has made significant gains in the 
region. Even Haiti, long considered 
an anomaly, ousted a military dicta­
torship to return Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide to office. Nevertheless, the 
literature also indicates that extrem­
ists on the left and right still have 
the potential to disrupt the democ­
ratic process.
A r g e n t i n a
The 1993 Argentine Elections.
Ernesto Cabrera, Maria Victoria 
Murillo. Electoral Studies, v. 13 
(June 1994), pp. 150-156.
Third Party Voting in Argentina: 
Ecological Analysis o f the 1991 
Elections. Fabian Echegaray, 
Gerardo Adrogue. La Jolla, CA: 
Center for Iberian and Latin 
American Studies, University of 
California, San Diego; 1994. 52 pp.
B o l i v i a
Foro politico electoral 1993: los 
programas de los partidos. H.C.F.
Mansilla, Carlos F. Toranzo Roca, 
eds. La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto 
Latinoamericano de Investigaciones
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American 
and Caribbean Librarian at Florida 
International University.
Sociales; 1994. 130 pp. [Compares 
platforms of the 1993 Bolivian politi­
cal parties.]
B r a z i l
The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local 
Party Organization in the 1989 
Brazilian Presidential Election.
Barry Ames. American Political 
Science Review, v. 88 (March 1994), 
pp. 95-111.
C h i l e
Claves del proceso politico: apre- 
ciacion sistemica de las elecciones 
de diciembre. Francisco Javier 
Cuadra. Santiago, Chile: Centro 
de Estudios Publicos; 1994. 13 pp. 
[Analyzes the results of 1993 Chilean 
elections.]
(Las) elecciones de 1993. Oscar 
Godoy Arcaya. Estudios Publicos 
(Chile), (Fall 1994), pp. 301-337. 
[Discusses Chile’s December 1993 
elections.]
C o l o m b i a
Nuevo congreso: curules por herencia.
Semana (Colombia), n. 621 (March 
29-April 5, 1994), pp. 34-37. [Despite 
constitutional changes designed to 
eliminate clientelism and nepotism, 
22 relatives of former politicians 
were elected in the congressional 
elections of March 13, 1994.]
C o s t a  R i c a
Costa Rica: la reafirmacion del 
bipartidismo. Oscar Fernandez. 
Nueva Sociedad, no. 131 (May-June 
1994), pp. 4-10. [Comments on the 
February 6, 1994 election.]
D o m i n i c a n  R e p u b l i c
Democracia y proceso electoral en 
Republica Dominicana. Pablo A. 
Marinez. Santo Domingo: Omega;
1994. 271 pp. [Examines political 
developments in the Dominican 
Republic.]
E c u a d o r
Ecuador: protestas sociales y 
elecciones. Osvaldo Leon. ALAI
Servicio Informativo, v. 18, n. 190 
(May 4, 1994), pp. 2-12. [Author 
argues that the incum bent Partido 
Social Cristiano won Ecuador’s May
1994 congressional elections despite 
public disillusionment with the polit­
ical system.]
E l  S a l v a d o r
El Salvador Tries to Vote. Steve 
Cagan. The Nation, v. 258, n. 15, 
(April 18, 1994), pp. 523-525.
El Salvador: elecciones y democra­
cia. Hector Dada. Nueva Sociedad 
(July-August 1994), pp. 22-28.
(Las) elecciones generates de 1994: 
consolidation de la hegemonia de 
ARENA. Carlos Acevedo. Estudios 
Centroamericanos, v. 49, nos. 545-546 
(March-April 1994), pp. 195-211.
Elections: The Right Consolidates 
Power. George Vickers, Jack 
Spence. NACLA Report on the 
Americas, v. 28 (July-August 1994), 
pp. 6-11.
Patria o gente! analisis de la cam- 
paha de ARENA y de la coalition.
Xavier Obach. Estudios Centroameri­
canos, v. 49, nos. 545-546.
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G u a t e m a l a
La mayoria de la minoria. Haroldo
Shetemul, Silvio Gramajo. Cronica 
(Guatemala), v. 7, no. 336 (August 
1994), pp. 19-23. [Argues that Guate­
mala's newly elected congress is not 
representative, as scarcely fifteen 
percent of the population voted.]
H o n d u r a s
Partido Liberal gana elecciones en 
Honduras. Instituto Centroamer- 
icano de Estudios Politicos.
Panorama Gentroamericano, v. 25, n.
89 (January 1994), pp. 15-17.
M e x i c o
Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?
Alan Knight. Journal ojLatin 
American Studies, v. 26 (Fall 1994), pp. 
73-107. [Discusses Lazaro Cardenas’s 
legacy in Mexico’s electoral politics.]
Economics and Elections: The 
Mexican Case. Michelle Brophy- 
Baermann. Social Science Quarterly, 
v. 75, n. 1 (March 1994), pp. 125-135.
Encuestas y resultados de la election  
de 1994. Miguel Basahez. Este Pais, 
n. 43 (October 1994), pp. 13-21. 
[Compares public opinion polls 
with electoral results in Mexico.]
Mexican Revolution? Jerry  
Hagstrom. National Journal, v. 26, 
no. 30 (July 23, 1994), pp. 1738-1743.
Mexico’s Delayed Democratization.
Wayne A. Cornelius. Foreign Policy, v. 
24 n. 95 (Summer 1994), pp. 53-71. 
[Examines electoral and political re­
forms introduced by Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari.]
Mexico: The Importance o f Being 
Ernesto. David C. Scott. Hemisfile, 
v. 5, n. 5. (September-October 
1994), pp. 1, 2, 12.
Mexico: Zapatista Thunder.
Lucy Conger. Current History, 
v. 93 (March 1994), pp. 115-120.
La organization de las elecciones: 
problemas y proyectos de solution.
Jorge Alcocer, Rodrigo Morales, eds. 
Mexico, DF: Porrua; 1994. 251 pp.
Symposium: Mexican Elections, 
Human Rights, and International 
Law (Opposition Views). Loyola
of Los Angeles, International and 
Comparative Law Journal, v. 16, n. 2 
(February 1994), pp. 299-411.
N I C A R A G U A
Pens and Polls in Nicaragua: An 
Analysis of the 1990 Pre-election 
Surveys. K. Bischoping,
H. Schuman. American Journal of 
Political Science, v. 36 (May 1992), 
pp. 331-350.
P a n a m a
Elections. The Opposition Returns 
to Power. George Priestley. NACLA 
Report on the Americas, v. 26 (January- 
March, 1994), pp. 11-14. [Examines 
and evaluates Panam a’s May 1994 
elections.]
In Panama, No People’s Choice.
Marc Cooper. The Nation, 
v. 258, n. 18 (May 9, 1994), 
pp. 630-632.
Panama: anos decisivos. Marco A. 
Gandasegui. Nueva Sociedad, no. 132 
(1994), pp. 4-9.
V e n e z u e l a
Deciphering the National Elections.
Federico Alvarez. NACLA Report on 
the Americas, v. 27, n. 5 (March-April 
1994), pp. 16-22. [Analyzes the 
December 5, 1993 Venezuelan 
national elections.]
The Deepening o f Democracy in a 
Crisis Setting: Political Reform and 
the Electoral Process in Venezuela.
Steve Ellner. Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, v. 35 
(Winter 1993/1994), pp. 1-42.
R e g i o n
Coyuntura electoral centroameri- 
cana 1994: El Salvador, Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Panama. Instituto 
Centroamericano de Estudios
Politicos. Panorama Centroamericano, 
v. 25, n. 94 (June 1994), pp. 1-18.
Enciclopedia electoral latinoameri- 
cana y del Caribe. Dieter Nohlen, 
ed. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto 
Latinoamericano de Derechos 
Humanos; 1993. 684 pp. [Compre­
hensive reference on Latin 
American electoral data.]
Latins Vote for Change. Arturo
Porzecanski. Euromoney (June 1994), 
pp. 115-117. [Compares recent elec­
tions with economic policy changes.]
Parties, Elections, and Political 
Participation in Latin America.
Jorge I. Dominguez, ed. New York: 
Garland, 1994. 424 pp.
Presidential Election Laws and 
Multipartism in Latin America. Mark
P. Jones. Political Research Quarterly, 
v. 47, n. 1 (March 1994), pp. 41-57.
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